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Colonial Structures and Ethnic Rivalries: Kenya

 Colonial Structures and Ethnic Rivalries: The Economic Dominance of Indians and African Exclusion in Kenya

The economic ascendancy of Indian immigrants in Kenya during the colonial era (late 19th century to 1960s) and the marginalization of native Africans created a volatile ethnic and economic divide that shaped Kenya’s post-independence trajectory. Indians, primarily from Gujarat and Punjab, transformed from railway laborers to dominant merchants, controlling commerce and urban real estate. By 1960, they owned 75–80% of Kenya’s retail businesses, despite being only 2% of the population (176,000 out of 8.6 million). “Indians were the commercial linchpin of colonial Kenya, but their prosperity sowed discord,” writes historian Robert Gregory (Gregory, 1993, p. 23). Africans, restricted to agriculture and denied education, faced systemic exclusion. The British racial hierarchy exacerbated tensions, positioning Indians as intermediaries. Post-independence Africanization policies aimed to redress these disparities but disrupted the economy.

 

Colonial Foundations of Indian Economic Success

Indian migration to Kenya surged with the British construction of the Kenya-Uganda Railway (1896–1901), a 582-mile lifeline connecting Mombasa to Kisumu. Over 32,000 Indian laborers, clerks, and artisans were recruited, with 6,700 staying post-completion. “The railway was the catalyst for Indian settlement, launching their economic dominance,” states historian J.S. Mangat (Mangat, 1969, p. 62). These settlers, including Gujarati traders and Punjabi craftsmen, established small shops (dukawallahs) in towns like Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru. By 1960, Indians controlled 75–80% of retail trade, 60% of textile manufacturing, and key export sectors like sisal and coffee (Oonk, 2004, p. 105). Prominent Indian firms, such as Chandaria Industries and the Shah family’s hardware empire, exemplified their industrial reach.

Colonial policies positioned Indians as economic intermediaries. “The British valued Indian skills in trade and administration, relegating Africans to manual labor,” notes historian Dane Kennedy (Kennedy, 1996, p. 83). Indians received trading licenses, bank loans, and urban land leases, enabling them to dominate commerce. For example, in Nairobi’s Bazaar Street, Indian-owned shops sold imported textiles and hardware, while African vendors were confined to open-air markets. “Indians controlled the supply chain from African producers to European exporters,” writes economist Mahmood Mamdani (Mamdani, 1976, p. 127). In Mombasa, Indian merchants like Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee built vast trading networks, handling ivory and spices. Africans, by contrast, grew cash crops like maize and coffee but sold them at low prices to Indian middlemen, fostering perceptions of exploitation. “Africans saw Indians as profiting off their labor,” observes historian John Iliffe (Iliffe, 1987, p. 197).

The British also facilitated Indian urban settlement. By 1960, 90% of Indians lived in cities, owning 60% of Nairobi’s commercial properties (World Bank, 1963). “Urban access gave Indians a head start in wealth accumulation,” says historian Tiyambe Zeleza (Zeleza, 1995, p. 137). In contrast, Africans were restricted to rural reserves or urban slums like Kibera, with only 15% owning urban property (Ogot, 1999, p. 206).

Cultural and Community Strengths of Indians

Indian success was amplified by cultural practices and community cohesion. Gujarati communities, such as the Patels and Lohanas, used caste-based networks to pool capital, share apprenticeships, and mitigate risks. “The Indian diaspora’s communal solidarity was their economic engine,” argues historian Gijsbert Oonk (Oonk, 2004, p. 92). For instance, the Ismaili community, led by figures like Allidina Visram, established credit systems that funded shops and warehouses. Families worked collectively, with children learning trade skills early. “Indian shops were family enterprises, maximizing efficiency,” notes education scholar Cynthia Salvadori (Salvadori, 1996, p. 49).

Education was a cornerstone of Indian success. Indian-run schools, like the Aga Khan School in Nairobi, taught commerce, accounting, and mathematics. By 1960, 80% of Indian children attended secondary school, compared to 5% of Africans (Salvadori, 1996, p. 72). “Education gave Indians a competitive edge in colonial markets,” says historian Frederick Cooper (Cooper, 2002, p. 71). Graduates like Manilal Desai became influential lawyers and accountants, strengthening Indian economic networks.

Indian cultural values emphasized frugality and reinvestment. “Indians lived modestly, plowing profits back into their businesses,” writes Mangat (Mangat, 1969, p. 89). This contrasted with African communities, where colonial taxes and land restrictions limited surplus capital. For example, Kikuyu farmers paid heavy hut taxes, reducing their ability to invest in trade (Elkan, 1960, p. 83).

African societies, including the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba, were ethnically diverse, hindering unified economic networks. “Colonialism fragmented African communities, undermining commercial cohesion,” notes historian Bethwell Ogot (Ogot, 1999, p. 214). Most Africans were rural, with 85% engaged in subsistence agriculture, limiting access to urban commerce (Gregory, 1993, p. 96). “Africans were tied to the land, while Indians dominated the markets,” says Zeleza (Zeleza, 1995, p. 145). However, some African groups, like the Kikuyu, developed trading skills, running small shops in Nyeri by the 1950s, but these were dwarfed by Indian enterprises.

Systemic Barriers to African Economic Mobility

Colonial policies systematically excluded Africans from economic opportunities. Land alienation was a critical barrier. The 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance reserved 7 million acres of fertile “White Highlands” for European settlers and Indian merchants, displacing Africans to crowded reserves. “Land loss crippled African economic prospects,” writes Ogot (Ogot, 1999, p. 223). By 1960, Africans owned less than 20% of urban property in Nairobi and Mombasa (World Bank, 1963). For example, Kikuyu families in Kiambu lost ancestral lands to European plantations, forcing them into wage labor.

Education was another bottleneck. Colonial budgets allocated only 1% to African education, focusing on basic literacy for labor roles. “The British educated Africans to serve, not to lead,” notes historian Ali Mazrui (Mazrui, 1986, p. 162). By 1960, only 5,000 Africans attended secondary school, compared to 14,000 Indians (Salvadori, 1996, p. 78). This limited African entry into skilled professions. For instance, while Indian accountants like V.S. Patel managed banks, Africans like Jomo Kenyatta struggled to access higher education until the 1930s.

African attempts at commerce were stifled. Cooperative societies, such as the Kikuyu Central Association’s trading ventures, faced resistance from Indian merchants who controlled supply chains. “Indians lobbied to protect their monopolies,” says economist Walter Elkan (Elkan, 1960, p. 91). Colonial regulations also required high license fees, unaffordable for most Africans. By 1960, African-owned shops in Nairobi numbered fewer than 500, compared to 4,000 Indian shops (Oonk, 2004, p. 112).

The Mau Mau uprising (1952–1960), a Kikuyu-led rebellion against land alienation, highlighted African economic frustration. “Mau Mau was as much about economic exclusion as political oppression,” writes historian John Lonsdale (Lonsdale, 2009, p. 128). The rebellion disrupted African communities, diverting resources from economic development.

The British Racial Hierarchy and Ethnic Tensions

The British colonial racial hierarchy—Europeans at the top, Indians in the middle, Africans at the bottom—intensified ethnic rivalries. “Indians were privileged over Africans but marginalized by Europeans,” notes historian Michael Twaddle (Twaddle, 1991, p. 69). For example, Indian teachers earned 50% more than African teachers but half of European salaries (Kennedy, 1996, p. 92). In Nairobi’s civil service, Indians held mid-level posts like clerks, while Africans were porters or cleaners. “The hierarchy created resentment on both sides,” says Mamdani (Mamdani, 1976, p. 150).

Africans perceived Indians as complicit in colonial exploitation. “Indians were the face of economic disparity in African eyes,” writes Iliffe (Iliffe, 1987, p. 205). For instance, in rural markets, Indian shopkeepers charged high prices for imported goods, while paying low prices for African produce. The British used Indians as a buffer class. “Indians absorbed African anger, shielding European settlers,” argues Cooper (Cooper, 2002, p. 79).

The British did not deliberately favor Indians but prioritized efficiency. “Indians were a cheap, skilled workforce for colonial needs,” notes Kennedy (Kennedy, 1996, p. 99). However, their neglect of African education and land rights ensured Indian dominance. “The British sowed inequality by default,” says Lonsdale (Lonsdale, 2009, p. 136). For example, while Indian schools received private funding, African schools relied on missionary charity, limiting access.

Rising Tensions and African Nationalism

The 1950s and 1960s saw surging African nationalism, driven by demands for independence (achieved in 1963) and economic equity. “Indians were seen as obstacles to African empowerment,” writes historian Richard Tavernier Himid (Himid, 1990, p. 183). Many Indians, uncertain about post-independence prospects, retained British or Indian passports, fueling African suspicions. “Citizenship ambiguities deepened ethnic divides,” notes Twaddle (Twaddle, 1991, p. 197). By 1963, only 30% of Indians held Kenyan citizenship (Oonk, 2004, p. 119).

Anti-Indian sentiment erupted in boycotts and violence. The 1959 Nairobi boycott targeted Indian shops, with slogans like “Buy African.” “Boycotts expressed African economic frustration,” says Ogot (Ogot, 1999, p. 239). In 1962, riots in Mombasa damaged Indian businesses, reflecting resentment over their wealth. “Indians were scapegoats for colonial inequities,” remarks historian Yash Tandon (Tandon, 1984, p. 161).

Unlike Uganda’s 1972 Asian expulsion, Kenya pursued gradual Africanization under President Jomo Kenyatta. The 1967 Trade Licensing Act restricted non-citizen Indians from trading in rural areas, requiring African partnerships. “Kenyatta balanced nationalism with economic stability,” notes Zeleza (Zeleza, 1995, p. 162). However, these policies pressured Indian businesses, with 20,000 Indians emigrating by 1970 (Gregory, 1993, p. 114).

Economic Aftermath of Africanization Policies

Africanization disrupted Kenya’s economy, particularly in retail and manufacturing. The 1967 Trade Licensing Act transferred 30% of Indian shops to Africans, but many lacked capital or expertise. “Africanization was well-intentioned but poorly executed,” says economist Paul Collier (Collier, 2003, p. 106). GDP growth slowed from 6.6% in 1963 to 4.1% by 1975 (World Bank, 1976). Textile mills in Thika, previously Indian-run, faced production declines due to mismanagement. “Kenya lost efficiency without Indian skills,” notes Zeleza (Zeleza, 1995, p. 169).

Retail markets like Nairobi’s River Road suffered, with shortages of goods previously supplied by Indian traders. “African traders struggled to fill the gap,” writes Elkan (Elkan, 1960, p. 98). Inflation rose by 8% annually in the early 1970s, straining consumers (World Bank, 1976). However, Kenya’s economy remained more resilient than Uganda’s post-expulsion collapse, thanks to its diversified agricultural exports (tea, coffee) and tourism. “Kenya’s diversity cushioned the blow,” says Cooper (Cooper, 2002, p. 150).

Many Indians adapted, acquiring citizenship or forming African partnerships. By the 1980s, Indian businesses regained prominence, with firms like Bidco Oil and Sameer Group leading in manufacturing. By 2020, Indian businesses contributed 60% of Kenya’s tax revenues (Oonk, 2020, p. 128). “Indians bounced back, but tensions lingered,” notes Mazrui (Mazrui, 1986, p. 183). Anti-Indian sentiment persists in Nairobi’s informal markets, where African traders resent Indian competition.

Was Indian Success “Normal”?

Indian economic dominance was a product of colonial structures, not inherent superiority. “Indians thrived because the colonial system favored them,” says Kennedy (Kennedy, 1996, p. 139). Africans faced systemic barriers, making Indian success predictable. “The colonial economy was designed for exclusion,” argues Mazrui (Mazrui, 1986, p. 183). Similar patterns occurred in South Africa, where Indian traders dominated Durban’s markets, and Fiji, where Indian merchants controlled sugar trade. “Indian diasporas succeeded globally where colonialism opened doors,” notes Oonk (Oonk, 2004, p. 150).

Cultural factors played a role but were secondary to structural advantages. “Indian networks were effective, but African potential was untapped,” says Cooper (Cooper, 2002, p. 86). With equal access, Africans like the Kikuyu traders in Nyeri showed commercial acumen. “The playing field was never level,” remarks Zeleza (Zeleza, 1995, p. 176).

 

Reflection

Kenya’s history of Indian economic dominance and African exclusion underscores the profound impact of colonial legacies. The British positioned Indians as commercial intermediaries, granting them urban access, education, and trading privileges, while Africans were confined to reserves and denied opportunities. “Colonialism rigged the economic game,” writes Mamdani (Mamdani, 1976, p. 172). Indian cultural strengths—cohesive networks, education, and frugality—amplified their success, but African potential was stifled by systemic barriers. “Africans were not less capable, just less empowered,” notes Cooper (Cooper, 2002, p. 172).

Post-independence Africanization policies, like the 1967 Trade Licensing Act, aimed to rectify disparities but disrupted commerce, slowing GDP growth and causing shortages. “Africanization needed preparation, not haste,” says Collier (Collier, 2003, p. 128). Indian resilience, contributing 60% of tax revenues by 2020, highlights their adaptability, but persistent anti-Indian sentiment reflects unresolved grievances. “Economic divides breed ethnic strife,” warns Zeleza (Zeleza, 1995, p. 196). The Mau Mau uprising and 1959 boycotts showed African frustration, a legacy of colonial inequities.

Kenya’s experience offers critical lessons for multi-ethnic societies. Equitable policies, investing in education and entrepreneurship across communities, are essential to prevent conflict. “Exclusion fuels resentment,” says Ogot (Ogot, 1999, p. 261). Kenya avoided Uganda’s drastic expulsion, but its economic disruptions highlight the need for inclusive development. “Nationalism must be paired with capacity-building,” remarks Tandon (Tandon, 1984, p. 183). Today, Kenya’s vibrant economy benefits from Indian and African contributions, but ethnic tensions in markets like Gikomba signal ongoing challenges. “History’s shadow lingers in economic rivalries,” notes Lonsdale (Lonsdale, 2009, p. 150). Addressing these requires acknowledging colonial roots, fostering inter-ethnic collaboration, and ensuring opportunities for all to build a cohesive, prosperous Kenya.

References

  • Collier, P. (2003). Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank.
  • Cooper, F. (2002). Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present. Cambridge University Press.
  • Elkan, W. (1960). Migrants and Proletarians: Urbanization in Africa. Oxford University Press.
  • Gregory, R. G. (1993). South Asians in East Africa: An Economic and Social History. Westview Press.
  • Himid, T. (1990). The Asian Communities in East Africa. Heinemann.
  • Iliffe, J. (1987). The African Poor: A History. Cambridge University Press.
  • Kennedy, D. (1996). The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations and the British Raj. University of California Press.
  • Lonsdale, J. (2009). The Dynamics of Colonialism in Africa. Routledge.
  • Mamdani, M. (1976). Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. Monthly Review Press.
  • Mangat, J. S. (1969). A History of the Asians in East Africa. Oxford University Press.
  • Mazrui, A. A. (1986). The Africans: A Triple Heritage. BBC Publications.
  • Ogot, B. A. (1999). Africa’s Past, Our Future. James Currey.
  • Oonk, G. (2004). The Karma of Trade: South Asians in East Africa. Brill.
  • Salvadori, C. (1996). We Came in Dhows: Stories of the Indian Pioneers. East African Publishers.
  • Tandon, Y. (1984). The Amin Years: A Political History of Uganda. Zed Books.
  • Twaddle, M. (1991). Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment. James Currey.
  • World Bank. (1963). Kenya Economic Survey. World Bank Publications.
  • World Bank. (1976). Kenya Economic Report. World Bank Publications.
  • Zeleza, T. (1995). A Modern Economic History of Africa. CODESRIA.

 

 



 

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