Introductory Note The US-China trade war, escalating since 2018, serves as a complex case study in game theory, reflecting strategies akin to the iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma and Hawk-Dove games. China employs a disciplined tit-for-tat strategy, mirroring US actions to deter aggression while signaling openness to cooperation, driven by its economic resilience and global trade networks. The US adopts a mixed Hawk-Dove approach, balancing aggressive tariffs with selective concessions, motivated by domestic politics and a desire to curb China’s technological rise. This essay delves into these strategies, their rationales, and their implications, while examining US actions against the EU and Russia. It analyzes the roles of ASEAN, India, the EU, other G7 nations, Africa, and Latin America, drawing insights on global dynamics. An appendix explores the iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma, Axelrod’s experiments, and conditions affecting strategy success, including when tit-for-tat falters. An annex...