Critical Analysis of India’s Defence Offset Policy: A
Comparative Perspective
India’s defence offset policy, introduced in 2005 and
formalized in 2006 under the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), mandates
foreign vendors to reinvest at least 30% of contracts valued over ₹300 crore
into India’s defence sector. Aimed at fostering self-reliance, technological
advancement, and economic growth, the policy sought to reduce India’s 70%
reliance on imported defence equipment (circa 2008). Nearly two decades later,
its effectiveness remains debated. This analysis critically evaluates the policy’s
outcomes, compares it with offset policies in Israel, Australia, Brazil, and
South Korea, and offers reform recommendations, drawing on expert insights and
data.
Objectives of India’s Defence Offset Policy
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) articulated the policy’s goals
in a 2012 press release: “to leverage capital acquisitions to develop Indian
defence industry by (i) fostering development of internationally competitive
enterprises, (ii) augmenting capacity for research, design, and development
related to defence products and services, and (iii) encouraging development of
synergistic sectors like civil aerospace and internal security.” The policy was
a cornerstone of India’s pursuit of ‘Atma Nirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India).
Achievements: Industrial Growth and Flexibility
The policy has spurred industrial growth, notably in
Bengaluru’s aerospace cluster. “The 2005 policy helped promote a vibrant
aerospace cluster, mostly MSMEs around Bengaluru,” notes a 2020 Drishti IAS
analysis. Smaller firms have benefited from outsourcing by Indian Offset
Partners (IOPs). “While the direct benefit may have accrued to only a handful
of big Indian companies, it is evident that downstream smaller companies have
also benefited from the policy because of outsourcing,” observes a former MoD
Financial Advisor (Acquisition).
Global firms like Boeing have leveraged their expertise,
with a representative stating, “Boeing has successfully implemented offset
programmes in over 35 countries… we have some relevant experience in this
area.” The policy’s flexibility, allowing offsets via direct purchases, joint
ventures, or technology transfers, has attracted such firms. “India now allows
technology transfers as a legitimate way to discharge offset obligations,” says
S. Amer Latif of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The
establishment of the Defence Offset Management Wing (DOMW) in 2012 enhanced
oversight. “It has recently established the DOMW… to more effectively monitor
the implementation of offsets,” Latif adds. Expanding offsets to civil
aviation, training, and homeland security has broadened its scope, as Latif
notes: “It has opened the number of areas allowable for executing offsets to
the fields of civil aviation, training, and homeland security.”
Shortcomings: Bureaucracy and Limited Technology Transfer
Despite these gains, the policy has failed to deliver on key
objectives, particularly technology transfer. A 2020 Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) report found “not a single case where the foreign vendor had
transferred high technology to the Indian industry.” Bureaucratic complexity
has been a major hurdle. “The terms and conditions and the procedure that
governs conclusion and execution of the offset contracts… are too convoluted,”
critiques the former MoD Financial Advisor. By 2022, 15 companies missed offset
deadlines, as noted by Minister Ajay Bhatt in a Lok Sabha response: “As many as
15 companies ‘have missed the first deadline set for implementation of their
defence offset commitment’.”
Vendors often prioritize direct purchases over technology
transfer, limiting innovation. “More than 90% of offset obligation was
discharged by the vendors through direct purchase of products and services,” an
IDSA study revealed. The 2020 dilution, exempting bilateral and single-vendor
deals, further weakened the policy. “As most defence deals are bilateral, or a
single supplier deal… this would virtually mean the scrapping of the defence
offset policy,” warns Drishti IAS. Misalignment with Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) policies restricts investment. “India’s FDI policy ‘defies logic’ as no
foreign investor will be interested in an Indian JV where it has ‘no
significant control, strict capacity/product constraints, no purchase
guarantee, no open access to other markets’,” argues defence expert Mrinal
Suman. Weak enforcement, with $2.24 billion in defaults by 2021, per ThePrint,
and inadequate monitoring exacerbate challenges. “The monitoring of
implementation of offset contracts was inadequate and had involved failing to
recover penalties due for non-fulfilment,” a 2013 RUSI report noted.
Monitoring and enforcement have also been weak. A 2013 Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI) report highlighted that “the monitoring of
implementation of offset contracts was inadequate and had involved failing to
recover penalties due for non-fulfilment of annual offset obligations.” The CAG
echoed this in 2020, noting, “In view of the fact that the offset policy has
not yielded the desired result, the Ministry needs to review the policy and its
implementation.”
The 2020 dilution of the offset policy, exempting bilateral
and single-vendor deals, has further undermined its potential. “As most defence
deals are bilateral, or a single supplier deal… this would virtually mean the
scrapping of the defence offset policy,” warns the Drishti IAS analysis. This
move, intended to reduce costs, may compromise long-term indigenization goals.
“The higher (upfront) cost of the agreement due to the offset clause would pay
for itself by reducing costs in the long term by indigenisation,” the analysis
argues.
Comparative Analysis
Israel: R&D-Driven Success
Israel’s offset policy, managed by the Industrial
Cooperation Authority under the Ministry of Economy, emphasizes technology
transfer and economic competitiveness. “Israel’s purchase of Combat Aircraft
from McDonnell Douglas for a 100% offset package… enabled the development of
Israeli Aircraft Industries, Cyclone Aviation Products, Israeli Military
Industries, and TAT Aero,” notes an Economic Times analysis. High offset
thresholds (often 100%) prioritize R&D and co-production, fostering
export-driven firms. “Focusing on R&D will improve the economy’s ability to
absorb heavy transfers and reap economic benefits,” the analysis adds. Unlike
India’s MoD-centric model, Israel’s integration with national economic goals
ensures broader impact. “Israel’s offset policy has been a key driver in
building a robust defence-industrial base,” says an IDSA monograph.
Australia: Flexible Global Integration
Australia’s offset policy, revised in 2007, focuses on
integrating local industries into global supply chains. “The Australian
approach is to use the industrial engagement elements… to give Australian
industry opportunities to capture business in the global aerospace and defence
market,” an IDSA analysis highlights. Managed by the Department of Industry, it
aligns with economic goals, unlike India’s siloed MoD structure. “In Australia,
Germany, Greece, South Korea… the Ministry of Defence plays an important part,
albeit in conjunction with commerce and trade ministries,” notes an Indian
Defence Review article. Australia’s flexible, indirect offset approach
diversifies benefits, contrasting with India’s rigid 30% direct offset model.
Brazil: Targeted Technology Transfer
Brazil’s offset policy, embedded in its defence procurement
framework, prioritizes technology transfer, as seen in the Gripen fighter jet
deal with Saab. “The Gripen offset programme transferred technology to
Brazilian firms, enabling co-production of aircraft components,” a 2020 Janes
report notes. Managed by the Ministry of Defence and industry bodies, Brazil’s
policy ensures specific technology transfers through clear contracts. “Brazil’s
offset agreements have significantly enhanced its aerospace capabilities,” says
a SIPRI report. India’s lack of such specificity limits similar outcomes.
South Korea: Export-Oriented Growth
South Korea’s offset policy, managed by the Defense
Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), focuses on self-reliance and
exports. “South Korea’s offset policy has been instrumental in developing
indigenous platforms like the K2 Black Panther tank,” a 2021 Defense News
article notes. With a 50% offset threshold and strict technology transfer
requirements, South Korea has become a global defence exporter. “Offsets have
enabled South Korea to become a global defence exporter,” says a CSIS report.
Unlike India’s bureaucratic delays, South Korea’s streamlined DAPA oversight
ensures compliance.
Inferences: A Mixed Legacy
India’s policy has fostered MSME growth but lags behind
Israel, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea in achieving technological
self-reliance. “India’s defence offset policy is mired in criticism for its
failure to produce the intended results,” notes the Financial Express. Israel’s
R&D focus and high offset thresholds have built an export-driven industry,
while Australia’s flexible approach integrates global supply chains. Brazil’s
targeted technology transfers and South Korea’s strict enforcement have yielded
strategic capabilities. In India, benefits are concentrated, with “the top 5 of
these 15 IOPs received 51.76%… of the offset business,” per the IDSA study. The
lack of a national offset policy, unlike other countries, limits coherence.
“Every country has a national offset policy and defence offset flows from the
national policy. India is perhaps the only exception,” critiques the Indian
Defence Review.
Areas for Reform
India can adopt Israel’s R&D focus and Brazil’s targeted
technology transfer model. “Focusing on R&D will improve the economy’s
ability to absorb heavy transfers,” advises the Economic Times. Australia’s
cross-ministerial approach could diversify benefits. “We need to diversify
offsets to non-defence sectors for overall economic benefits,” argues Pradeep
S. Mehta of CUTS International. South Korea’s streamlined oversight offers a
blueprint for enforcement. “What India needs is an effective body to handle offsets,
liberal FDI and licensing policies, and a better banking provision,” a 2009
Strategic Analysis article suggests. A national offset policy, a clear
technology transfer roadmap, and a dispute resolution tribunal, as proposed by
Lt. Col. JS Sodhi, could enhance effectiveness. “India needs to re-conceive or
re-imagine the offset clause in defence contracts with stricter enforcement,”
emphasizes Drishti IAS.
Conclusion
India’s defence offset policy has achieved modest industrial
growth but falls short of its goals of technological self-reliance and global
competitiveness, unlike Israel, Australia, Brazil, and South Korea. “India’s
defence markets become ever more lucrative… However, if India wishes to use
offsets to create a strong indigenous defence industry, it needs to foster a
transparent and streamlined regulatory environment,” warns a RUSI report. By
prioritizing technology transfer, aligning with national economic goals, and
adopting global best practices, India can strengthen its defence-industrial
base and advance toward ‘Atma Nirbhar Bharat.’
References
- Latif,
S. Amer. (2012). Defense Offsets in India. Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
- India’s
Defence Offset Policy – A comprehensive analysis. (2022). The
Financial Express.
- What
India can learn from Global Offset Experiences. Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses.
- Behera,
L. Kumar. (2009). India’s Defence Offset Policy. Strategic
Analysis, 33(2), 242-253.
- Indian
Defence Offset Regime: Need for Reforms. (2024). Indian Defence
Review.
- Dilution
of Offset Policy. (2020). Drishti IAS.
- Defence
Offset Policy: View. (2022). The Economic Times.
- The
Implementation of India’s Defence Offset Policy. (2013). Royal United
Services Institute.
- India’s
defence offset contracts are in shambles. (2022). ThePrint.
- Brazil’s
Gripen Offset Programme. (2020). Janes.
- South
Korea’s Defense Industry Growth. (2021). Defense News.
- @YusufDFI.
(2020). X Post.
- @manupubby.
(2020). X Post.
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