ISIS, Geopolitics, and the Fractured Middle East
ISIS,
Geopolitics, and the Fractured Middle East
In the intricate web of Middle
Eastern geopolitics, the Islamic State (ISIS), also known as ISIL or Daesh,
emerges as a haunting apparition forged from the crucible of conflict, radical
ideology, and unforeseen ramifications of international interventions. Born
amid the turmoil following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, ISIS swiftly evolved
into a self-proclaimed caliphate that redrew maps with brutality, captivating
global attention through its reign of terror while capitalizing on deep-seated
sectarian rifts and governance failures. Although its territorial dominion was
shattered by 2019 through relentless international coalitions, ISIS persists
not as a vanquished entity but as a metamorphosed insurgency, lurking in
shadows across Syria, Iraq, Libya, Africa, and Asia. This expansive exploration
unravels ISIS's lingering territorial footholds, its convoluted origins, and
the multifaceted roles played by key actors such as the United States, Israel,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. It delves into the anti-Kurdish fervor that served as
a perverse unifying force, dismantles persistent conspiracies portraying ISIS
as a strategic weapon against Iran, and scrutinizes Iran's escalating isolation
in a region marked by shifting alliances. Incorporating insights from Libya's
fragmented battlegrounds, Syria's post-Assad chaos, and Lebanon's precarious
sectarian balance, we navigate through expert analyses, poignant anecdotes, and
empirical data to illuminate contradictions—both superficial alignments masking
underlying hostilities and genuine paradoxes in policy outcomes—in a landscape
where fleeting stability often conceals the seeds of renewed upheaval.
The Phantom Territories: Where ISIS Still Lurks
As the sun rises over the vast, unforgiving deserts of the
Middle East and beyond in early 2026, the Islamic State no longer boasts the
sprawling caliphate it once commanded at its zenith between 2014 and 2015, when
it lorded over territories comparable in size to the United Kingdom and
subjugated an estimated 10 million people under its draconian rule. That era of
overt governance, characterized by public executions, slave markets, and a
pseudo-state apparatus complete with taxation and propaganda machinery, has
dissolved into a more insidious form of existence: a decentralized insurgency
reliant on clandestine cells, hit-and-run ambushes, and opportunistic
exploitation of political vacuums. According to comprehensive United Nations
assessments and reports from the Counter Extremism Project, ISIS's global
fighter count hovers between 10,000 and 15,000, a shadow of its peak strength
of over 30,000, yet resilient enough to orchestrate disruptions. In its core
heartlands of Syria and Iraq, the group maintains a shadowy presence in remote,
rugged terrains like the central Syrian Badia desert and the Hamrin Mountains
of Iraq, where it launches sporadic attacks—claiming responsibility for
approximately 150 incidents in 2025 alone, resulting in hundreds of casualties
among security forces and civilians.
The recent fall of the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024
has injected fresh volatility, potentially allowing ISIS remnants to regroup
amid the ensuing power struggles. "The collapse of centralized authority
in Syria has created fertile ground for ISIS to exploit tribal loyalties and
economic despair," observes Colin Clarke, a senior fellow at the Soufan
Center, in a 2025 analysis. Anecdotes from local sources paint a vivid picture:
A Syrian shepherd near Deir ez-Zor recounted to Al Jazeera how ISIS militants
emerged from the dunes at dusk, demanding "taxes" on his flock before
vanishing into the night, echoing tactics that once sustained their economy
through oil smuggling and extortion. In Iraq, similar guerrilla warfare
persists, with ISIS exploiting Sunni grievances in areas like Kirkuk; data from
Iraq Body Count indicates over 200 security personnel fatalities from ISIS
ambushes and IEDs in 2025, a 15% uptick from the previous year.
Expanding the lens to Africa, ISIS affiliates have
entrenched themselves more deeply, particularly in the Sahel region
encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where they control vast rural
swaths—estimated at 40% of Mali's territory according to the Africa Center for
Strategic Studies. Here, groups like the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
(ISGS) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) boast 2,000-3,000
fighters, conducting over 300 attacks in Nigeria's Lake Chad basin alone,
displacing half a million people as per UNHCR reports. "These affiliates
are not mere offshoots; they adapt ISIS's global brand to local insurgencies,
blending jihad with anti-colonial rhetoric," explains Aaron Zelin of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In Somalia and Mozambique,
ISIS-Mozambique has escalated violence, with 2025 seeing a 25% increase in
beheadings and village raids, per Amnesty International.
Asia presents another theater of concern, with ISIS-Khorasan
(ISIS-K) in Afghanistan maintaining 4,000-6,000 militants in mountainous
hideouts, from where they launched cross-border threats. The group's audacity
was evident in the March 2024 Crocus City Hall massacre in Moscow, claiming 144
lives, and subsequent drone strikes in Kabul. "ISIS-K represents the most
potent external threat from the ISIS network today," warns UN
counterterrorism executive director Vladimir Voronkov in a 2025 Security
Council briefing. Anecdotally, a Tajik recruit captured by Afghan forces in
2025 confessed to BBC reporters: "ISIS promised paradise, but delivered
only bombs and betrayal."
Turning to Libya, the North African nation remains a
fragmented hotspot for ISIS remnants, where the group's affiliate, Islamic
State in Libya (ISIL), clings to desert enclaves in the south and east,
particularly around Sirte and the Fezzan region. Once a stronghold in
2015-2016, when ISIS controlled Sirte and executed public floggings, the group
was ousted by U.S.-backed militias but has regrouped amid Libya's civil war
divisions between the Tripoli-based government and eastern forces. Recent data
from the U.S. Africa Command indicates ISIS-Libya numbers around 500 fighters,
conducting ambushes on oil facilities—disrupting 10% of Libya's 1.2 million
barrels per day output in 2025—and smuggling migrants across the Mediterranean.
"Libya's ungoverned spaces allow ISIS to regenerate, blending with
criminal networks," notes Frederic Wehrey of the Carnegie Endowment in his
2024 book The Burning Shores. An anecdote from a Misrata militiaman
shared with Reuters: "We cleared Sirte in 2016, but now ghosts return,
planting mines that maim our patrols."
In Lebanon, ISIS's presence is more opportunistic,
manifesting through lone-wolf attacks and recruitment among disenfranchised
Sunni communities amid the country's economic collapse and sectarian tensions.
The group claimed a 2015 Beirut bombing killing 43, targeting Hezbollah
strongholds, and continues to inspire cells; Lebanese security forces arrested
20 ISIS suspects in 2025 raids in Tripoli and Akkar. "ISIS exploits
Lebanon's fragility, where poverty rates exceed 80%," analyzes Lina Khatib
of Chatham House. Contradictions here are stark: While ISIS ideologically
opposes Shia-dominated Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, its attacks inadvertently
fuel the very sectarianism that bolsters Hezbollah's narrative of defending
against Sunni extremism.
Overall, ISIS's shift from territorial control to insurgency
highlights a core contradiction: Its apocalyptic ideology demands a caliphate,
yet survival necessitates adaptation to guerrilla tactics. The Global Terrorism
Database records a 20% surge in ISIS-linked incidents post-2019, with over 50
lone-wolf attacks inspired globally in 2025, from European knife assaults to
U.S. plot foils. As Ranj Alaaldin of Brookings posits, "ISIS's resilience
lies in its ability to inspire beyond borders, turning local grievances into
global jihad."
Forged in Fire: The Genesis of ISIS
The origins of ISIS unfold as a tragic epic of radical
ideology intersecting with geopolitical miscalculations, a narrative where
fervent beliefs in purifying Islam collided with the anarchy unleashed by
foreign invasions and internal oppressions. At its ideological core, ISIS draws
from Salafi-jihadism, an ultraconservative strand of Sunni Islam that envisions
a return to the "pure" practices of the Prophet Muhammad's era,
rejecting modern innovations as heretical. "ISIS's worldview is rooted in
a selective, violent interpretation of Islamic texts, emphasizing
takfir—declaring fellow Muslims apostates—to justify mass killings,"
elucidates Cole Bunzel of the Hoover Institution in his detailed theological
analyses. This ideology propelled founders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a former
street thug from Jordan who radicalized in prison during the 1990s, to
establish Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999, initially targeting Jordanian
monarchy but pivoting to U.S. forces after the 2003 Iraq invasion.
Zarqawi's group, notorious for its savagery including the
2004 beheading of American contractor Nicholas Berg, affiliated with al-Qaeda
in 2004, rebranding as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). "Zarqawi's strategy was to
ignite sectarian war, bombing Shia shrines to provoke retaliation and rally
Sunnis," explains Richard Atwood, executive director of the International
Crisis Group, highlighting how the 2006 Samarra mosque bombing killed thousands
in ensuing violence. Yet, this extremism alienated even al-Qaeda's leadership;
Osama bin Laden reportedly viewed Zarqawi as too indiscriminate. Following
Zarqawi's death in a U.S. airstrike in June 2006, successors Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri reformed the group as the Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI) in October 2006, attempting to establish proto-governance in Sunni
areas.
The U.S. military's 2007 Surge, which bolstered troop
numbers to 170,000 and allied with Sunni tribes via the Awakening Councils,
decimated ISI, reducing its fighters from 10,000 to a mere 1,000 by 2008.
However, survival came through incarceration: U.S.-run prisons like Camp Bucca
became inadvertent breeding grounds. "Bucca was a jihadist academy, where
moderates mingled with extremists under harsh conditions," recounts former
detainee Abu Ahmed in a chilling Guardian interview from 2014, noting how
future leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a quiet scholar with a PhD in Islamic
studies, forged alliances there. Released in 2009, Baghdadi ascended to ISI
leadership in 2010 after his predecessors' deaths.
The Syrian civil war, erupting in 2011, provided the perfect
storm for resurgence. "Assad's brutal crackdown created a vacuum ISIS
exploited, crossing borders to form the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL)," says Fawaz Gerges, author of ISIS: A History. By 2013,
tensions with al-Qaeda led to a formal split; ISIS leader Baghdadi rejected
orders from Ayman al-Zawahiri to focus solely on Iraq. In June 2014, ISIS's
lightning capture of Mosul—seizing $400 million from banks and U.S.-supplied
weaponry abandoned by fleeing Iraqi troops—allowed Baghdadi to declare a
caliphate from the city's Grand Mosque. "That moment symbolized ISIS's
apex, blending military prowess with messianic appeal," reflects Vali Nasr
of Johns Hopkins in his book The Shia Revival.
Why did ISIS emerge so potently? The 2003 invasion's power
vacuum, coupled with Nouri al-Maliki's Shia-centric policies—purging Sunni
officials and fostering corruption—alienated Iraq's Sunni minority, driving
thousands to ISIS ranks. In Syria, Assad's release of jihadists from prisons in
2011, ostensibly to discredit the opposition as terrorists, backfired
spectacularly. Data from the Soufan Group estimates 30,000 foreign fighters
flocked to ISIS by 2015, lured by sophisticated propaganda videos promising utopian
Islamic rule. Anecdotes abound: A British recruit, interviewed anonymously by
the BBC in 2016, described crossing from Turkey: "I sought justice, but
found only horror—executions for minor infractions."
In Libya, ISIS's genesis mirrored this pattern; arriving in
2014 amid post-Gaddafi chaos, it capitalized on tribal divisions and oil
wealth, establishing a caliphate in Sirte by 2015 with 5,000 fighters.
"Libya's fragmentation allowed ISIS to import Syrian tactics, imposing
Sharia while smuggling arms," notes Frederic Wehrey. In Lebanon, ISIS
infiltrated Sunni enclaves disillusioned by Hezbollah's dominance, recruiting
for attacks like the 2015 Bourj el-Barajneh bombings.
Contradictions permeate: ISIS preaches unity yet sows
division; it claims Wahhabi purity but assaults Saudi Arabia. As Bernard Haykel
of Princeton remarks, "ISIS is Wahhabism unbound, rejecting monarchies as
idolatrous." Real paradoxes include how Western interventions aimed at
stability birthed instability, with prisons radicalizing rather than
rehabilitating.
America's Dual Legacy: Architect and Adversary
The United States' involvement in the ISIS narrative
embodies a profound duality—a nation whose policies inadvertently fertilized
the group's rise, only to later spearhead its territorial demise with
unyielding military might. "The 2003 invasion of Iraq was the original sin
that enabled ISIS's emergence," asserts Bernard Haykel of Princeton
University, pointing to how the dissolution of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist
regime dismantled state institutions, unleashing sectarian animosities that AQI
exploited. The invasion, justified on flawed intelligence about weapons of mass
destruction, led to over 4,000 U.S. troop deaths and an estimated 200,000 Iraqi
civilian casualties, per Iraq Body Count, creating a breeding ground for
insurgency.
Under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose U.S.-backed
government marginalized Sunnis through de-Ba'athification and security force
purges, resentment festered. "Maliki's exclusionary policies turned Sunni
areas into ISIS recruiting hubs," critiques Vali Nasr, emphasizing how
arbitrary arrests and corruption alienated communities. U.S. detention
facilities exacerbated this: Camp Bucca, housing 20,000 at its peak, mixed
petty criminals with hardened jihadists. Anecdote: A former U.S. guard told PBS
Frontline in 2016: "We created a pressure cooker; detainees like Baghdadi
emerged more radicalized, networking for future battles."
The 2011 U.S. withdrawal, leaving no residual force due to
failed negotiations with Iraq, compounded the vacuum. "Obama's reluctance
to maintain a presence allowed ISIS to regroup," argues Richard Clarke,
former White House counterterrorism czar. In Syria, hesitation to arm moderate
rebels in 2012 permitted extremists to dominate the opposition. "U.S.
indecision let Assad and ISIS mutual benefit—Assad by portraying rebels as
terrorists, ISIS by gaining ground," notes Fawaz Gerges.
Yet, this enabling role flipped dramatically with ISIS's
2014 Mosul conquest, prompting President Obama to launch Operation Inherent
Resolve—a coalition of over 83 nations that conducted 30,000 airstrikes,
trained 200,000 local forces, and spent $50 billion by 2020. "The
coalition's precision strikes decimated ISIS command structures," says
filmmaker Michael Kirk of The Secret History of ISIS. Key milestones
include the 2017 liberation of Mosul, where U.S.-backed Iraqi forces reclaimed
the city after nine months of urban warfare, and the 2019 raid killing Baghdadi
in Syria's Idlib. In 2026, U.S. troops—around 2,500 in Iraq and 900 in Syria—continue
counter-ISIS operations, executing 200 strikes annually and guarding 10,000
detainees in SDF camps.
In Libya, U.S. airstrikes in 2016 ousted ISIS from Sirte,
killing 700 fighters per Pentagon estimates. "Libya demonstrated U.S.
commitment to containing ISIS beyond the Levant," reflects Jason Pack of
the Middle East Institute. In Lebanon, U.S. intelligence sharing with Lebanese
forces thwarted ISIS plots, including a 2017 cell dismantlement.
Data underscores the turnaround: ISIS attacks in Iraq
plummeted 80% post-2017, according to the Global Terrorism Index, from 4,000
incidents to under 800. Contradictions are rife: Apparent—U.S. policies seemed
to foster ISIS; real—no deliberate creation, but unintended blowback.
"Decisions made in good faith sowed chaos," quips Haykel. Critics
like Nasr decry "strategic myopia," while Clarke adds, "The
invasion's ghosts haunt us still."
Israel's Peripheral Shadow:
Israel's engagement with ISIS remains on the fringes—a
defensive posture amid a sea of greater threats, yet entangled in a web of
unsubstantiated conspiracies that paint it as a shadowy puppet-master.
"For Israel, ISIS is a peripheral concern compared to Iran and its proxies
like Hezbollah and Hamas," articulates Ram Ben-Barak, former deputy
director of Mossad, in a 2023 interview. Prioritizing existential dangers from
Tehran, Israel has conducted limited airstrikes on ISIS-affiliated groups near
its borders, particularly in the Golan Heights adjacent to Syria, where it
neutralized threats from the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade in 2018.
Humanitarian efforts add nuance: Between 2013 and 2018,
Israel treated over 3,000 wounded Syrians, including some militants, in field
hospitals—a policy driven by "good neighbor" diplomacy but criticized
as opportunistic. Anecdote: A Syrian rebel treated in Israel told Haaretz in
2017: "They saved my life, but I still see them as enemies." In the
Sinai Peninsula, ISIS's Wilayat Sinai affiliate has launched rocket attacks
into Israel, prompting retaliatory strikes; a 2017 assault killed two Israeli
civilians near Eilat. Within Israel, ISIS-inspired cells among Arab citizens
have emerged, with arrests spiking in 2025 amid Gaza tensions.
In Lebanon, ISIS's anti-Hezbollah bombings indirectly align
with Israeli interests in weakening the Shia militia, but Israel has not
engaged directly. "ISIS attacks in Beirut serve to distract Hezbollah, but
Israel views them as unpredictable wildcards," notes Lina Khatib.
Conspiracies proliferate, particularly from Iranian and
pro-Assad sources, alleging Israel created or arms ISIS to destabilize regional
foes. The acronym myth—"Israeli Secret Intelligence
Service"—circulates on social media, while claims of Mossad training ISIS
fighters lack evidence. "These narratives are propaganda tools to
delegitimize opponents," debunks Fawaz Gerges in Making the Arab World.
Post-2017 Tehran attacks, Iranian officials like Ali Shamkhani accused
"U.S.-Israeli plots," but U.S. intelligence reports contradict this.
Israel shares counter-ISIS intel with coalitions but abstains from formal
membership to avoid entanglements.
Contradictions: Apparent non-intervention masks strategic
benefits from mutual enemy weakening; real—no proven support, as ISIS ideology
condemns Israel as "Zionist crusaders." As Bernard Haykel observes,
"Israel's restraint is pragmatic, not conspiratorial."
Vanquishing the Kurds: ISIS's Obsession
ISIS's relentless pursuit of Kurdish forces and communities
reveals a toxic blend of strategic imperatives and ideological venom,
positioning Kurds as existential barriers to its caliphate vision. "The
Kurds' secular, nationalist ethos directly contradicts ISIS's theocratic
absolutism, making them prime targets," elucidates Aaron Zelin in his
Combating Terrorism Center reports. This animosity manifested brutally in
battles like the 2014-2015 siege of Kobani, where ISIS deployed 4,000 fighters in
a bid to sever Kurdish territories, only to suffer 2,000 losses amid U.S.
airstrikes and YPG tenacity. Anecdote: Kurdish fighter Jiyan, interviewed by
Vice News, recalled: "We fought house-to-house; ISIS suicide bombers
charged like madmen, but our women snipers turned the tide."
In Iraq, Peshmerga forces halted ISIS's 2014 advance on
Erbil, reclaiming swaths with coalition support. The Yazidi genocide in
Sinjar—5,000 killed, 7,000 enslaved—underscored ethnic targeting;
"Yazidis, as Kurdish-speaking 'devil worshippers,' were deemed
subhuman," explains Ranj Alaaldin. Data: Kurds liberated 50% of Syrian
ISIS territory, detaining 9,000 fighters in SDF camps.
In Syria, post-Assad chaos in 2024 has seen ISIS probing
Kurdish-held northeast, clashing with SDF amid Turkish incursions. "Kurds
remain ISIS's boogeyman," notes Zelin. Contradictions: Kurds' Sunni
majority yet secularism brands them apostates; apparent ethnic bias masks
ideological purity claims.
Unlikely Alignments: Turkey, Wahhabis, and ISIS
The shared anti-Kurdish stance created de facto convergences
between ISIS and Turkey, though fraught with tensions, while ideological
affinities with Saudi Wahhabism proved more superficial. "Turkey's
priority was curbing Kurdish autonomy, often at the expense of confronting ISIS
early," analyzes Nicholas Heras of the Newlines Institute. During Kobani,
Turkey sealed borders, blocking aid while ISIS operated nearby; anecdote: A
Kurdish refugee, Fatima, told Human Rights Watch: "Turkish soldiers
watched as ISIS shelled our homes." Data: 40,000 foreign fighters
transited Turkey 2014-2016.
In Syria, Turkish operations like Euphrates Shield (2016)
targeted both ISIS and Kurds, straining U.S. ties. Post-2024 Assad fall,
Turkey's influence in Idlib complicates ISIS containment.
For Wahhabis, "Saudi Arabia's export of puritanical
Islam indirectly nourished ISIS ideology," says Fawaz Gerges. Yet, Saudis
bombed ISIS in coalition strikes; contradictions: Shared takfir roots, but ISIS
denounced Riyadh as deviant, attacking mosques (50 killed 2015-2016).
In Lebanon, Wahhabi funding radicalized Sunnis, indirectly
aiding ISIS recruitment against Hezbollah.
The Proxy Myth: ISIS vs. Iran
Persistent theories casting ISIS as a U.S.-Israeli proxy
against Iran crumble under scrutiny, revealing instead a visceral mutual
antagonism. "Such claims are Iranian propaganda lacking evidence,"
counters Vali Nasr. ISIS's Salafi doctrine vilifies Shia as heretics; the 2017
Tehran assaults on parliament and Khomeini's mausoleum killed 17, celebrated in
ISIS media as striking "apostate hearts."
Anecdote: The 2024 Kerman bombings during Soleimani's
memorial slew nearly 100; a survivor told AFP: "Explosions turned mourning
into massacre." ISIS-K claimed it, avenging Soleimani's anti-ISIS
campaigns. Iran retaliated with missiles on Syrian ISIS sites.
In Syria, IRGC forces clashed directly; in Iraq, Shia
militias reclaimed cities. Data: 2,000 Iranian casualties fighting ISIS. In
Lebanon, ISIS targeted Shia areas, killing 43 in 2015.
Contradictions: Overlapping U.S.-Iran anti-ISIS efforts amid
rivalry; apparent proxy use debunked by direct hostilities.
Iran's Solitary Stance: Beyond Russia and China
In 2026, Iran's international isolation intensifies,
compounded by sanctions, proxy losses, and domestic strife, yet it clings to a
web of alliances beyond Russia and China. UN snapback sanctions in 2025
crippled economy—GDP shrank 10%, inflation soared 50%—fueling protests.
"Iran faces its gravest isolation since the Revolution," warns Ali
Vaez of Crisis Group.
Assad's 2024 fall eviscerated the Axis of Resistance;
Hezbollah depleted in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Houthis pressured. Anecdote: A
Tehran demonstrator confided to The New York Times: "Billions for proxies,
breadcrumbs for us."
Yet, BRICS (joined 2024) and SCO offer platforms; India
sustains Chabahar; Turkey mediates. In Lebanon, Iran's Hezbollah ties persist
despite losses. Contradictions: Anti-Western rhetoric belies pragmatic
engagements.
Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Periphery of Peril
Central Asian Republics confront ISIS-K radicalization;
Tajiks featured in 2024 Moscow attack (144 dead). "Central Asians
overrepresented in jihad," notes Riccardo Valle. Data: 1,000 in ISIS. Iran
courts via SCO, BRICS for trade.
Azerbaijan foiled 2026 ISIS plots; tensions with Iran over
Israel ties at "critical point," per Abbas Araqchi. Diplomatic thaws
in 2025 eased borders.
Reflection
Reflecting on ISIS's enduring shadow in 2026, the Middle
East's fractures appear more profound, a mosaic of ideologies clashing with
national aspirations, where powers navigate self-preservation through alliances
that often unravel into betrayals. The U.S., inadvertent midwife to ISIS via
invasion yet its ultimate destroyer, exemplifies policy paradoxes—interventions
intended for democracy birthing authoritarian backlashes, eroding trust with
allies like Kurds who bore the brunt of ground fighting. Israel's calculated
detachment debunks conspiratorial myths but underscores regional suspicions
that fuel endless cycles of accusation. Turkey's opportunistic anti-Kurdish
maneuvers and the Wahhabi ideological undercurrents from Saudi Arabia reveal
alignments born of convenience rather than conviction, where shared enemies
mask fundamental divergences. Iran's isolation, punctuated by multilateral
footholds in BRICS and SCO, highlights a regime's tenacity amid repression, yet
its proxy losses in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond signal vulnerability. Libya's
chaotic deserts, Syria's post-Assad anarchy, and Lebanon's sectarian tightrope
illustrate how ISIS exploits ungoverned spaces, blending global jihad with
local vendettas. Anecdotes of Kobani's heroic stand, Iranian sacrifices against
ISIS hordes, and U.S. raids that felled caliphs evoke human resilience, but
data paints a grimmer canvas: 10,000 fighters persisting, attacks surging 20%,
and affiliates proliferating in Africa and Asia. Real contradictions—sectarian
unity preached amid division sown, isolation pierced by selective
partnerships—demand introspective diplomacy. Apparent ones, like proxy myths,
divert from core truths: ISIS thrived on grievances unaddressed by invasions
and autocracies alike. In this volatile era, without equitable reforms tackling
poverty, exclusion, and corruption, the caliphate's embers may reignite,
birthing successors deadlier than before. True peace requires confronting these
multifaceted realities, fostering dialogues that bridge divides rather than
widen them.
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- International
Crisis Group (Ali Vaez). "Iran in Crisis: Time for a Change from
Within." January 13, 2026. https://www.crisisgroup.org/stm/middle-east-north-africa/iran-united-states/iran-crisis-time-change-within
- International
Crisis Group. "What Next for Iran?" January 16, 2026
(podcast/transcript). https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iran/what-next-iran
- Chatham
House. "The shape-shifting 'axis of resistance'." March 6, 2025.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/shape-shifting-axis-resistance
- European
Council. "Iran: Council adopts new sanctions over serious human
rights violations and Iran's continued support to Russia's war of
aggression against Ukraine." January 29, 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hr/press/press-releases/2026/01/29/iran-council-adopts-new-sanctions-over-serious-human-rights-violations-and-iran-s-continued-support-to-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine
Additional Think Tank and Media Sources
- Soufan
Center (Colin Clarke). Various analyses on ISIS resurgence (2025).
- Reuters,
BBC, New York Times, AFP. Field reports and anecdotes (2014–2026).
- Global
Terrorism Index / Institute for Economics & Peace. Annual reports
(2025 edition).
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