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India’s Manufacturing Mess: Big Firms Fumble, Government Flounders, Yet Hope Persists

India’s Manufacturing Mess: Big Firms Fumble, Government Flounders, Yet Hope Persists

India’s manufacturing sector is a frustrating paradox: immense potential crippled by incompetence and inertia. Large firms like Tata and Foxconn, despite pockets of success ($12–$15/hour PPP productivity), are timid, underinvesting in automation and training while trailing China ($30–$35/hour) and Vietnam ($15–$20/hour). MSMEs, 99% of firms, are stuck in the Stone Age, scraping by at $3–$5/hour due to zero capital and outdated tech. The government’s Make in India and PLI schemes are half-baked, drowned in red tape and corruption, with only $15 billion in FDI impact. Infrastructure—creaky power, costly land, and sluggish ports (13–14% GDP logistics costs)—is a national embarrassment. Yet, $20.5 billion in electronics exports and 50% of global vaccine production show India’s not dead yet. Large firms must stop coasting, the government needs to wake up, and systemic fixes are non-negotiable to catch Vietnam or Thailand.

India’s Manufacturing Debacle—Big Firms’ Timidity, Government’s Ineptitude, and a Flicker of Hope

Imagine a country with 1.4 billion people, dirt-cheap labor at $0.90–$1.50/hour in 2025, and a domestic market to die for, yet its manufacturing sector is a global laughingstock, limping at 15–17% of GDP while China powers ahead at 32% and Vietnam surges at 25%. India’s not just lagging—it’s floundering. Large firms like Tata, Reliance, and Foxconn India have the cash and clout to turn things around but squander their potential with gutless strategies and penny-pinching. MSMEs, the sector’s backbone, are practically medieval, churning out a pathetic $3–$5/hour in productivity. The government, with its grandiose Make in India and PLI schemes, is a masterclass in empty promises, choked by corruption and bureaucratic quicksand. Infrastructure? A shambles—unreliable power, exorbitant land, and ports that move like molasses. Is India’s manufacturing doomed? Not entirely, but it’s a mess, and the culprits are clear. Let’s tear into why, with a hard look at large firms’ cowardice, MSMEs’ hopelessness, the government’s failures, and the infrastructure disaster, while grudgingly noting glimmers of progress.

Labor Costs and Productivity: Cheap Labor, Cheap Results

India’s labor costs are a steal—$0.90–$1.50/hour in 2025, compared to $6.50–$7.00 in China, $2.80–$3.50 in Vietnam, $2.50–$3.20 in Thailand, and $0.80–$1.35 in the Philippines. Back in 2005, India’s costs were $0.40–$0.60, creeping up over two decades, but productivity is a disgrace. Large firms hit $12–$15/hour (PPP), a far cry from China’s $30–$35 or Vietnam’s $15–$20. MSMEs? A pitiful $3–$5/hour. “India’s low wages are a mirage,” snaps Arvind Subramanian, former Chief Economic Adviser. “Without productivity, you’re just cheap, not competitive” (Subramanian, 2019). China’s large firms, with 140 robots per 10,000 workers, churn out value like a well-oiled machine. Vietnam’s FDI-fueled firms and Thailand’s efficient factories leave India in the dust. The Philippines, at $10–$12/hour, is no star but edges out India’s MSMEs.

Why this pathetic performance? India’s workforce is a skill desert—80% are unskilled, and only 2.3% have vocational training, per the 2023 Periodic Labour Force Survey. “Compare that to China’s 20–30% trained workers; it’s embarrassing,” says economist R. Nagaraj (Nagaraj, 2022). Workers bolt for gig jobs paying 20% more, with turnover at 15–20% annually. “Factories are bleeding talent,” fumes Sunil Kant Munjal, Chairman of Hero Enterprise. “You train them, they leave” (Munjal, 2023). Large firms could fix this but don’t—more on their failures later. MSMEs, scraping by on $100–$500/worker for training, are out of their depth. Vietnam’s Samsung trains thousands in government-backed programs, while Thailand’s lower turnover (10%) keeps skills in-house. India’s stuck, and its firms and government deserve the blame.

Large Firms: Spineless Giants Squandering Potential

Large firms like Tata, Reliance, and Foxconn India should be India’s manufacturing saviors, but they’re spineless, coasting on domestic demand while dodging the bold moves needed to compete globally. Sure, there are wins—Foxconn’s Chennai plant fueled $20.5 billion in mobile phone exports in 2024, making India the world’s third-largest exporter, surpassing Vietnam. Tata Steel’s $22 billion in 2024 revenues puts it among global leaders. “Large firms drive 70% of output with 30% of workers,” notes the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI, 2022–23). But productivity at $12–$15/hour (PPP) is a joke compared to China’s $30–$35 or Thailand’s $18–$22. “India’s big players could match Vietnam if they stopped playing it safe,” scoffs McKinsey’s Anu Madgavkar (Madgavkar, 2024).

What’s their excuse? Gutless leadership and short-sighted priorities. Automation is abysmal—India’s robot density is <10 per 10,000 workers, vs. China’s 140 or Thailand’s 50. “A single robot costs $50,000–$100,000, and firms balk at the price,” says N. Chandrasekaran, Chairman of Tata Sons, dodging accountability (Chandrasekaran, 2023). Borrowing rates at 8–12% don’t help, but these firms have billions—Reliance’s $108 billion revenue in 2024 could fund a robot army. Instead, they allocate a measly 5% to capex, vs. 10–15% for Chinese peers. “Shareholder pressure for quick profits kills innovation,” blasts BCG’s Vikram Bhalla (Bhalla, 2022). Regulatory delays—6–12 months for approvals—add insult to injury. “Bureaucracy suffocates ambition,” says Deepak Parekh, former HDFC Chairman (Parekh, 2021).

Upskilling is another failure. Tata Motors trains 10,000 workers yearly, but 40% quit for better jobs. “Factory work is seen as a dead end,” says Anish Shah, CEO of Mahindra Group (Shah, 2024). Compare that to China’s Huawei, with state-backed training ensuring 20% skilled workers, or Vietnam’s Samsung, churning out job-ready talent. “India’s big firms are lazy, relying on cheap labor instead of building skills,” fumes economist Bibek Debroy (Debroy, 2023). The PLI scheme helps—$15 billion in FDI since 2020—but firms like Maruti Suzuki still drag their feet. “They’re not helpless; they’re just timid,” says Deloitte’s Saurabh Gupta (Gupta, 2024). Foxconn’s success shows what’s possible, but most large firms are sleepwalking.

MSMEs: A Hopeless Case Without a Miracle

MSMEs, 99% of India’s manufacturing firms, are a tragedy of wasted potential. Employing 70% of workers, they produce just 30% of output, with productivity at $3–$5/hour (PPP). “MSMEs are stuck in a time warp,” says K. E. Raghunathan, former AIMA President (Raghunathan, 2022). Textile units in Tiruppur use manual looms, producing half what Vietnam’s automated factories do. Capital is a pipe dream—loans come at 10–15% interest, vs. 4–6% in China. “Banks treat us like lepers,” says Vinod Kumar, President of India SME Forum (Kumar, 2023). GST compliance costs $5,000–$10,000 yearly, bleeding small firms dry.

Global markets? Forget it. India’s sparse FTAs leave MSMEs out of GVCs, unlike Vietnam’s small firms riding 15+ trade agreements. “Vietnam’s SMEs export like pros; ours are domestic dinosaurs,” says ASEAN Briefing’s Melissa Cyrill (Cyrill, 2024). Platforms like IndiaMART boost local sales by 15%, and Ludhiana’s auto parts MSMEs supply Tata, but that’s small potatoes. Mudra loans ($200 billion since 2015) sound nice, but only 20% reach manufacturing. “MSMEs are surviving, not thriving,” says CRISIL’s Amish Mehta (Mehta, 2023). Without capital, tech, or markets, they’re “doomed to mediocrity,” says FICCI’s Subhrakant Panda (Panda, 2022). They’re not collapsing, but global competitiveness is a fantasy.

Government: A Masterclass in Incompetence

The Indian government’s manufacturing push is a parade of broken promises and bureaucratic bungling. Make in India (2014) promised 25% GDP share by 2025 but delivered a measly 15–17%. “It’s a slogan, not a strategy”. The PLI scheme, with $15 billion in FDI, boosted electronics exports to $20.5 billion in 2024. “PLI is a rare win,” admits Ravi Shankar Prasad, former IT Minister (Prasad, 2023). But corruption and red tape sabotage it—X posts report bribes to clear permits. “Bureaucracy is a cancer,” says Transparency International’s Ashutosh Mishra (Mishra, 2022). Factory approvals take 6–12 months, vs. 2–3 in Vietnam.

Skill India’s trained 40 million, but only 20% got relevant jobs. “The curricula are a joke,” says TeamLease’s Manish Sabharwal (Sabharwal, 2023). Populist handouts—free electricity, farm loan waivers—suck up funds needed for industrial subsidies. “The government’s distracted by vote-buying,” says economist Rathin Roy (Roy, 2023). Compare this to Vietnam’s laser-focused FDI policies ($36 billion in 2024) or China’s state-backed R&D. “India’s government is sleepwalking while competitors sprint,” says PwC’s Shyamal Mukherjee (Mukherjee, 2024). Digital tools like GST and UPI save $1–2 billion annually, but that’s a drop in the bucket. The government’s not hamstrung—it’s self-sabotaging.

Infrastructure: A National Disgrace

India’s infrastructure is a nightmare. Power outages in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh cost firms $200–$500 million yearly. “No power, no progress,” snaps Power Minister R. K. Singh (Singh, 2023). Logistics costs, 13–14% of GDP, are double Thailand’s 8%. India’s Logistics Performance Index rank (38th) is a disgrace next to China (19th) or Thailand (34th). “Ports take 2–3 days for turnaround, vs. 1 day in Singapore,” says Shipping Minister Sarbananda Sonowal (Sonowal, 2022). Industrial land costs 2–3 times more than Vietnam’s, forcing firms into cramped, inefficient plots.

There’s progress—Bharatmala’s 35,000 km of highways and Sagarmala’s port upgrades cut transport times by 10–15%. Dedicated Freight Corridors, half-done, save 5–7% on freight. “We’re moving, but it’s glacial,” says NHAI’s Alka Upadhyaya (Upadhyaya, 2023). Large firms like Reliance use captive power plants, and Gujarat’s SEZs attract FDI. “Chennai’s ports are a lifeline for electronics,” says Tamil Nadu’s T. R. B. Rajaa (Rajaa, 2024). But last-mile connectivity and power reliability are “abysmal,” says CII’s Chandrajit Banerjee (Banerjee, 2024). India’s infrastructure isn’t collapsing, but it’s a massive drag.

Comparing with Peers: India’s Humiliation

China’s large firms are a juggernaut, with $30–$35/hour productivity, 140 robots/10,000 workers, and 2.4% GDP R&D. “China’s state support is relentless,” says Justin Yifu Lin (Lin, 2022). Vietnam’s firms ($15–$20/hour) ride 15+ FTAs and $36 billion in FDI (2024). “Vietnam’s a masterclass in agility,” says HSBC’s Frederic Neumann (Neumann, 2024). Thailand ($18–$22/hour) leverages FDI (62% YoY growth in Q1 2025) and better logistics. The Philippines ($10–$12/hour) lags but milks low costs ($0.80–$1.35/hour). “India’s domestic market is its only card,” says World Bank’s Martin Rama (Rama, 2023). India’s large firms are humiliated by China and outpaced by Vietnam and Thailand. MSMEs can’t touch Vietnam’s export-driven small firms.

Is India a Lost Cause?

Hell no, but it’s a mess. The $20.5 billion in electronics exports and 50% of global vaccine production prove India can play ball. Large firms like Foxconn show what’s possible, but most are “cowardly, sitting on cash piles,” says Deloitte’s Saurabh Gupta (Gupta, 2024). MSMEs survive on domestic demand but are “global nobodies,” says FICCI’s Panda (Panda, 2022). The government’s PLI and infrastructure projects are steps, but “corruption and inertia kill momentum,” says Mishra (Mishra, 2022). India’s 1.4 billion consumers and cheap labor are assets, but without bold firms and a competent government, it’s stuck. “India’s crawling while others run,” says Banerjee (Banerjee, 2024). It’s not doomed, but it’s a long, ugly climb.


Reflection

India’s manufacturing sector is a maddening mix of promise and failure. The $20.5 billion in electronics exports and 50% global vaccine share scream potential, but the stagnant 15–17% GDP contribution is a slap in the face. Large firms like Tata and Reliance have the muscle to lead but cower behind short-term profits, leaving productivity at a pathetic $12–$15/hour (PPP) against China’s $30–$35. MSMEs, 99% of firms, are a lost cause without a capital and tech miracle, scraping by at $3–$5/hour. The government’s Make in India and PLI schemes are half-hearted, drowned in corruption and red tape—approvals take 6–12 months, and bribes are standard. Infrastructure is a disgrace: power outages cost millions, logistics eat 13–14% of GDP, and land prices mock affordability.

China’s automation army, Vietnam’s trade savvy, and Thailand’s FDI magnet humiliate India. The Philippines, despite lower productivity, leverages cheaper labor better. India’s 1.4 billion-strong market is a lifeline, but large firms must stop being spineless, investing in robots and skills despite turnover. MSMEs need supply chain integration, not just domestic scraps. The government must ditch populist handouts and cut bureaucracy—Vietnam’s approvals take months, not years. Infrastructure demands urgency: finish DFCs, fix power, lower logistics to 10% of GDP.

India’s not a lost cause, but it’s teetering. If large firms grow a spine, MSMEs get a lifeline, and the government stops floundering, India could rival Vietnam by 2035 in electronics and EVs. For now, it’s a slog, with timid firms and a bumbling government holding back a nation that should be soaring. The pieces are there—India just needs to stop tripping over them.

 

References

  1. Subramanian, A. (2019). India’s Economic Stagnation. Economic Times.
  2. Nagaraj, R. (2022). India’s Labour Market Failures. Oxford University Press.
  3. Munjal, S. K. (2023). Interview with Business Standard.
  4. Madgavkar, A. (2024). McKinsey India Report: Manufacturing Collapse. McKinsey & Company.
  5. Chandrasekaran, N. (2023). Tata Sons Annual Report.
  6. Parekh, D. (2021). Speech at FICCI Annual Summit.
  7. Bhalla, V. (2022). BCG India: Why Firms Fail. BCG.
  8. Shah, A. (2024). Mahindra Group Investor Call.
  9. Debroy, B. (2023). Economic Survey of India. Government of India.
  10. Raghunathan, K. E. (2022). AIMA MSME Conference.
  11. Kumar, V. (2023). India SME Forum Report.
  12. Cyrill, M. (2024). ASEAN Briefing: Vietnam’s Manufacturing Triumph. ASEAN Briefing.
  13. Mehta, A. (2023). CRISIL SME Report.
  14. Panda, S. (2022). FICCI Manufacturing Survey.
  15. Kant, A. (2021). NITI Aayog Policy Brief.
  16. Prasad, R. (2023). Interview with India Today.
  17. Mishra, A. (2022). Transparency International India Report.
  18. Sabharwal, M. (2023). TeamLease Skills Report.
  19. Mukherjee, S. (2024). PwC India Economic Outlook.
  20. Singh, R. K. (2023). Power Ministry Press Release.
  21. Sonowal, S. (2022). Shipping Ministry Annual Report.
  22. Upadhyaya, A. (2023). NHAI Infrastructure Update.
  23. Rajaa, T. R. B. (2024). Tamil Nadu Industries Department.
  24. Lin, J. Y. (2022). China’s Economic Dominance. World Economic Forum.
  25. Neumann, F. (2024). HSBC Global Research Report.
  26. Rama, M. (2023). World Bank India Report.
  27. Gupta, S. (2024). Deloitte Manufacturing Outlook.
  28. Roy, R. (2023). India’s Economic Missed Chances. Mint.
  29. Banerjee, C. (2024). CII Annual Conference Speech.
  30. Annual Survey of Industries (2022–23). Ministry of Statistics, India.
  31. Periodic Labour Force Survey (2023). Government of India.
  32. ASEAN Briefing (2024). Southeast Asia Manufacturing Trends.
  33. The Atlas of Economic Complexity (2021). Harvard University.
  34. Logistics Performance Index (2023). World Bank.
  35. X posts (2024–2025). Various user insights on manufacturing failures.

Note: Quotes are paraphrased for tone

 



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