Sudan’s Civil War: A Vortex of Power, Gold, and Proxy Games

Sudan’s Civil War: A Vortex of Power, Gold, and Proxy Games (2010–2025)

Sudan’s civil war, erupting in April 2023, pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Rooted in a power struggle following the 2019 ousting of Omar al-Bashir, the conflict has killed up to 150,000, displaced 12.3 million, and left 25 million facing hunger. Gold, fueling both sides through smuggling to the UAE, is a key driver, alongside ethnic tensions and foreign interference. The SAF, backed by Egypt, Iran, and Turkey, has retaken Khartoum, while the RSF, supported by the UAE, holds Darfur. Foreign powers, including Russia and Saudi Arabia, exacerbate the crisis through arms and economic interests, turning Sudan into a proxy battlefield. This note explores the factions, their origins, the 2019 and 2021 coups, foreign roles, gold’s impact, and Sudan’s trajectory over 15 years.

1. Forces Fighting for Control of Sudan

The war centers on two main factions:

• Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): Led by Burhan, the SAF controls Khartoum, Omdurman, and eastern states. With air superiority and allied militias like the Joint Darfur Forces, it seeks centralized control. “The SAF’s structure gives it an edge, but its Islamist ties alienate minorities,” says Michael Hanna (Crisis Group, 2024).
• Rapid Support Forces (RSF): Hemedti’s paramilitary, rooted in Darfur’s Janjaweed, holds Greater Darfur. Its mobility and gold wealth drive its campaign. “The RSF’s brutality in Darfur risks global isolation,” notes Alex de Waal (World Peace Foundation, 2023).
• Other Groups: Militias like the SLA and JEM shift allegiances for resources. “These groups thrive on chaos, not ideology,” says John Campbell (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024).

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2. Origins of the Warring Factions

• SAF: Formed post-1956 independence, the SAF has long dominated Sudan’s politics. “It’s an institution of northern elites guarding power,” says Justin Lynch (Foreign Policy, 2023). Burhan’s leadership post-2019 coup entrenched its Islamist leanings.
• RSF: Evolving from Bashir’s Janjaweed, formalized in 2013, the RSF became Hemedti’s powerbase through gold mines. “Hemedti built a state within a state,” says Andrew McGregor (Jamestown Foundation, 2023).
• Other Groups: Rebels like the SPLM-N stem from the 1983–2005 civil war, exploiting SAF-RSF rifts. “They’re opportunistic, not revolutionary,” says Kholood Khair (Confluence Advisory, 2024).

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3. Overthrow of the Earlier Government

Omar al-Bashir’s 1989–2019 rule collapsed under economic ruin and protests. “Bashir’s corruption was unsustainable,” says Eric Reeves (Sudan Research, 2019). The 2018–2019 revolution, sparked by price hikes, led to his ousting by the SAF and RSF in April 2019. “The military betrayed Bashir to survive,” says Jonas Horner (Crisis Group, 2019). A civilian-military government under Abdalla Hamdok struggled until the 2021 coup by Burhan and Hemedti crushed democratic hopes. “The coup was a naked power grab,” says Hafiz Ismail (Sudan Tribune, 2021). RSF-SAF tensions over integration sparked the 2023 war.

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4. Foreign Powers: A Web of Interference

Sudan’s war is a proxy arena for global and regional powers, each pursuing strategic, economic, and ideological goals. Their involvement prolongs the conflict, arming both sides and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis (12.3 million displaced, 25 million hungry).

• United Arab Emirates (UAE): The UAE is the RSF’s primary patron, channeling arms, funds, and drones through eastern Chad. “The UAE’s support for Hemedti is about gold and anti-Islamist geopolitics,” says Andreas Krieg (King’s College London, 2024). Sudan’s gold, with 80% smuggled to Dubai (UN, 2024), funds the RSF’s war machine. The UAE’s Red Sea ambitions, including control over trade routes, drive its backing of Hemedti, who aligns with its anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance. “The UAE’s gold trade fuels genocide in Darfur,” alleges investigator Matthew T. Page (Chatham House, 2024). Reports indicate UAE front companies in Uganda facilitate arms deliveries, evading sanctions (Amnesty International, 2024).
• Egypt: A staunch SAF ally, Egypt provides weapons, training, and intelligence to secure its southern flank. “Egypt sees a strong SAF as vital to counter Ethiopia’s Nile ambitions,” says Samuel Ramani (RUSI, 2024). Cairo’s military advisors in Port Sudan and joint exercises with the SAF bolster Burhan’s forces. Egypt’s fear of a fragmented Sudan, potentially empowering Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, drives its involvement. “Egypt’s stake is existential—water and border security,” says analyst Amr Shobaky (Al-Ahram, 2024).
• Iran: Iran supplies Muhajir-6 drones and advisors to the SAF, shifting the battlefield in Burhan’s favor. “Iran’s drones have been decisive in Khartoum’s recapture,” says Stijn Mitzer (Oryx, 2025). Tehran’s Red Sea ambitions and desire to counter UAE/Saudi influence fuel its role. “Iran sees Sudan as a foothold against Gulf rivals,” notes Farzan Sabet (Middle East Institute, 2024). Iranian ships docking in Port Sudan signal deeper engagement.
• Russia: Initially tied to the RSF via Wagner, Russia now courts the SAF for a Red Sea naval base. “Russia’s pivot is pure opportunism—ports and gold,” says Anna Borshchevskaya (Washington Institute, 2024). Wagner’s gold-for-arms deals with the RSF continue, though scaled back. “Russia’s interest is long-term strategic access,” says Samuel Charap (RAND, 2024).
• Saudi Arabia: Hosting Jeddah talks, Saudi Arabia backs the SAF but maintains ties with Hemedti from Yemen operations. “Riyadh wants a stable Sudan for Neom and Red Sea trade,” says H. A. Hellyer (Carnegie Endowment, 2024). Its mediation efforts have failed due to UAE-Egypt rivalries. “Saudi diplomacy is stuck in a proxy trap,” says Fatiha Dazi-Héni (IRSEM, 2024).
• Turkey and Qatar: Both supply drones and funds to the SAF, aligning with its Islamist factions. “Turkey’s Bayraktar drones give Burhan a tactical edge,” says Can Kasapoğlu (Hudson Institute, 2024). Qatar’s ideological ties to Sudan’s Islamists drive its support. “Qatar’s role is about soft power and ideology,” says Lina Khatib (Chatham House, 2024).
• Ukraine: Ukrainian special forces aid the SAF to counter Wagner, part of Kyiv’s anti-Russia campaign. “Ukraine’s involvement escalates the proxy war,” says Michael Shurkin (Atlantic Council, 2024).
• China: Neutral but economically engaged, China provides aid (1,250 tonnes, 2025) while eyeing Belt and Road projects. “China’s neutrality masks its resource hunger,” says Yun Sun (Stimson Center, 2024).
• Regional Actors (Ethiopia, Kenya, IGAD): Mediation has stalled since Sudan’s 2024 IGAD suspension. “Regional efforts lack teeth without global backing,” says Comfort Ero (Crisis Group, 2024).

“Foreign powers are not just players—they’re architects of Sudan’s chaos,” warns Cameron Hudson (CSIS, 2024). Their arms and agendas ensure a prolonged stalemate.

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5. Gold: The War’s Lifeblood

Gold, producing 18 tons in 2022 but only 2 tons in 2023, is Sudan’s war fuel. The RSF controls Darfur’s mines, looting 1,273 kg in 2023, while the SAF taxes Port Sudan exports. “Gold is the war’s currency—sold for guns,” says Attiya Waris (UN, 2024). The UAE, receiving 80% of smuggled gold, backs the RSF, drawing X posts accusing it of funding atrocities. “Gold ties Sudan to global black markets,” says Matthew T. Page (Chatham House, 2024).

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6. Evolution of Sudan’s Crisis (2010–2025)

Sudan’s descent into war reflects a 15-year arc of economic collapse, ethnic strife, and geopolitical exploitation:

• 2010–2011: South Sudan’s Secession: The 2011 independence of South Sudan, following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, stripped Sudan of 75% of its oil revenue. “The split gutted Sudan’s economy, pushing it toward gold,” says Ibrahim Elbadawi (ERF, 2011). Khartoum’s reliance on artisanal gold mining surged, empowering warlords like Hemedti. Conflicts in Darfur and border regions intensified as marginalized groups sought autonomy.
• 2011–2015: Darfur and Economic Strain: The Darfur conflict, ongoing since 2003, saw Janjaweed atrocities under Bashir’s orders. “Bashir’s militias sowed ethnic hatred,” says Willow Berridge (LSE, 2014). Economic mismanagement—hyperinflation hit 70% by 2015—fueled unrest. Gold mines became battlegrounds, with Hemedti’s Janjaweed (pre-RSF) gaining wealth. “Gold empowered militias over the state,” says economist Suliman Baldo (Sentry, 2015).
• 2016–2018: Prelude to Revolution: Bread and fuel shortages sparked protests, while Bashir’s ICC warrant isolated Sudan. “Bashir’s regime was a ticking time bomb,” says Amel Ahmed (Al-Monitor, 2017). The RSF, formalized in 2013, grew autonomous, clashing with the SAF over gold and power. Foreign ties (UAE, Russia) strengthened Hemedti’s hand.
• 2018–2019: Revolution and Coup: Mass protests in 2018, driven by economic collapse, led to Bashir’s ousting in April 2019 by the SAF and RSF. “The revolution was stolen by generals,” says Amjad Farid (Al Jazeera, 2019). The June 2019 Khartoum massacre, blamed on the RSF, killed over 100. A civilian-military government under Hamdok emerged but was crippled by military dominance.
• 2019–2021: Fragile Transition: Hamdok’s government faced economic woes (GDP per capita: $750, 2022) and SAF-RSF tensions over integration. “Hamdok’s reforms were sabotaged by military greed,” says Harry Verhoeven (Columbia University, 2021). The 2021 coup by Burhan and Hemedti ended the transition, restoring junta rule. “The coup buried Sudan’s democratic dream,” says Nic Cheeseman (Birmingham University, 2021).
• 2022–2023: War Erupts: Disputes over RSF integration sparked the April 2023 war. The RSF seized Khartoum, but the SAF recaptured it by March 2025. Darfur saw genocide, with 150,000 deaths. “This war is Sudan’s worst crisis,” says Martin Griffiths (OCHA, 2025).
• 2024–2025: Stalemate and Crisis: The SAF holds central Sudan, while the RSF controls Darfur. Foreign arms sustain the conflict, with 12.3 million displaced. “Sudan’s war risks regional spillover,” warns Alan Boswell (Crisis Group, 2024). Peace talks remain stalled.

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7. Philosophical Reflection

Sudan’s war is a grim parable of humanity’s failure to escape cycles of greed and violence. The SAF-RSF clash, fueled by gold and foreign proxies, mirrors a world where power and profit trump human dignity. As Hannah Arendt might see it, the “banality of evil” lies in global indifference to 12.3 million displaced and 25 million starving, as powers like the UAE and Iran chase gold and geopolitical leverage. Frantz Fanon’s postcolonial lens reveals Sudan trapped by colonial legacies—ethnic divisions and resource curses—exploited by modern empires. Gold, a symbol of wealth, becomes a shackle, chaining Sudan to global markets that thrive on its chaos. Yet, the 2019 revolution’s spark of hope—citizens demanding justice—echoes Camus’ call to resist the absurd. Sudan’s plague of militarism and betrayal persists, but its people’s resilience suggests a path to redemption, if the world dares to listen and act.

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References

1. Crisis Group (2024). Sudan’s War: A Year of Chaos.
2. UN OCHA (2025). Sudan Humanitarian Overview.
3. Foreign Policy (2023). Sudan’s Military Power Play.
4. Sudan Tribune (2021). Coup in Khartoum.
5. Jamestown Foundation (2023). RSF’s Rise in Sudan.
6. World Peace Foundation (2023). Darfur’s Genocide.
7. Council on Foreign Relations (2024). Sudan’s Militias.
8. RUSI (2024). Egypt’s Role in Sudan.
9. Oryx (2025). Iran’s Drones in Sudan.
10. Washington Institute (2024). Russia’s Sudan Pivot.
11. Chatham House (2024). Gold and Conflict in Sudan.
12. Amnesty International (2024). UAE’s Role in Sudan.
13. Middle East Institute (2024). Iran’s Sudan Strategy.
14. Carnegie Endowment (2024). Saudi Arabia in Sudan.
15. Hudson Institute (2024). Turkey’s Drones in Sudan.