The Arithmetic of Influence
Why
India’s Delimitation Debate Misses the Point
The
debate over expanding India's Parliament from 543 to a proposed 850 seats has
become a flashpoint for a deeper, more uncomfortable question: does increasing
the number of elected representatives actually strengthen democracy, or does it
merely expand political patronage without improving accountability? Drawing on
Mancur Olson's theory of collective action, this article argues that the
logical remedy for India's governance challenges lies not in enlarging the Lok
Sabha but in creating more states and devolving power to them. Smaller
political units enable more perceptible contributions and greater
accountability, while parliamentary expansion risks institutionalising the very
dynamics that keep citizens passive and politicians powerful. The masses' embrace
of the "more MPs" solution over genuine federal reform illustrates a
tragic irony—the public buys into a dubious logic that ultimately serves
organised interests rather than diffuse public good. Data on state performance,
fiscal costs, and regional disparities reveal that India's federal structure,
not its parliamentary headcount, is where meaningful reform must begin.
The Olson Lens: Why Small Groups Win
The late American economist Mancur Olson, in his seminal
work The Logic of Collective Action, upended a long-held assumption
in political science: that individuals with common interests will automatically
act together to achieve them. His core argument was devastatingly simple.
Rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve a common or group
interest unless the group is small, or there exists coercion or some other
selective incentive to make them do so. In large groups, the "free
rider" problem dominates—any single person's contribution to a shared goal
is so imperceptible that the rational choice is to let others do the work while
still enjoying the benefits.
This insight has profound implications for governance. Small
groups succeed because each member's contribution is visible and essential;
large groups fail because they cannot solve the coordination problem without
coercion or selective benefits. Olson saw this dynamic as the key to
understanding why some societies grow faster than others. In The Rise
and Decline of Nations, he extended his theory to argue that distributional
coalitions—special interest groups that form for collective action—inevitably
slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and reallocate
resources, thereby reducing the rate of economic growth.
As one analysis of Olson's work notes, "distributional
coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive and seek to limit the
diversity of incomes and values of their membership". The accumulation of
such coalitions increases the complexity of regulation and changes the
direction of social evolution. This is why nations with long periods of stable
democracy, like Britain, often grow more slowly than those that have
experienced upheavals that destroyed entrenched interest groups. Olson himself
tested this theory by regressing income growth rates on the variable
STAHOD—years since statehood, proxying the strength of interest groups—and
found a negative and significant coefficient, vindicating his hypothesis.
The political scientist Yogendra Yadav has articulated a
related concern about India's delimitation debate. He has long argued that
delimitation based purely on population would reward states that have lagged in
human development while punishing those that invested in education, healthcare,
and family planning. His concern is not only about regional imbalance but about
the erosion of incentives that underpin good governance.
India's Endemic Capture: When Olson Meets Federalism
India presents a textbook case of Olson's logic amplified by
scale, diversity, and federal complexity. The free-rider problem is endemic.
Caste and community groups function as highly organised "small
groups" with built-in selective incentives—marriage networks, local trade
monopolies, and mutual insurance—that enable them to punch far above their
demographic weight in local politics. Farmers' lobbies in specific states
extract massive subsidies while the diffuse 1.4 billion consumers pay higher
food prices and remain unorganised. Urban residents, a large and diffuse group,
remain apathetic about infrastructure, while local Resident Welfare
Associations in posh colonies successfully block garbage dumps or demand metro
stations.
The former union minister and constitutional expert
Santhanam warned during the Constituent Assembly debates that excessive
centralisation of power would weaken states and undermine the federal compact.
He predicted that without adequate financial resources, states would struggle
to invest in development projects and would have to seek central assistance for
basic services like education and sanitation. He went so far as to suggest that
if the proposed power distribution continued, it might be better to abandon the
federal system altogether and adopt a unitary one.
This prediction has proven eerily prescient. The Indian
National Congress, which functioned as an umbrella organisation during the
freedom struggle, provides an instructive counterpoint. Scholars have noted
that the INC's success in managing collective action stemmed from its ability
to create incentives for participation and sanctions for non-participation.
Local committees were equipped with relief funds to provide living expenses to
activists' families while withholding support from non-participants. Weekly
reports on mobilisation and finances were mandated, and this practice became
institutionalised as "the Congress way." Even when leadership
changed, party procedures and voting rules were maintained, preventing
factional conflict from escalating into division.
The Delimitation Dilemma: More Seats, More Problems
The Union Government has tabled the Constitution (One
Hundred and Thirty-First Amendment) Bill, proposing to expand the Lok Sabha's
strength from 543 to 850 seats. The primary rationale is to implement the 33
per cent women's quota for the 2029 general elections without reducing the
number of seats currently held by men—a move designed to minimise internal
political friction. Under the "pro rata expansion" model favoured by
the Centre, the existing seat share of each state is expected to be increased
by approximately 56 per cent.
This proportional increase is a strategic choice aimed at
maintaining the current relative political weightage of each state, thereby
attempting to neutralise the "North-South divide" that has
historically stalled delimitation exercises. Uttar Pradesh, which currently has
80 seats, is projected to rise to approximately 125 seats. Bihar would jump
from 40 to roughly 62 seats, and Maharashtra from 48 to 75 seats. Tamil Nadu
would move from 39 to 61 seats, and Kerala from 20 to 31 seats.
However, opposition leaders have warned that the proposals
would "reduce the share of southern states" and fundamentally distort
representation. A study by Milan Vaishnav and Jamie Hutchison at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace underscores how delimitation could
dramatically shift political power toward northern states, exacerbate regional
inequalities, and intensify political polarisation.
The critics have characterised the exercise not as neutral
redistricting but as "silent gerrymandering." Unlike the overt
manipulation of constituency boundaries, this operates at a higher
level—altering the distribution of seats themselves. The danger lies in its
permanence: once parliamentary seats are redistributed and political power
recalibrated, reversing the change becomes nearly impossible without another
constitutional upheaval.
The Fiscal Arithmetic: The Hidden Costs of Expansion
Beyond the political implications, the expansion of
Parliament carries substantial fiscal costs that are rarely discussed in the
public debate. Each Member of Parliament costs the exchequer roughly Rs 4–4.5
crore annually, including salary, allowances, travel, staff, and perks. These
include a Rs 1.24 lakh monthly salary, Rs 2 lakh housing allowance, free
flights, unlimited rail travel, subsidised utilities, and comprehensive medical
care. Even a single term guarantees a lifetime pension of Rs 31,000 per month.
As of 2018–19, 3,580 former MPs, along with dependents, drew
pensions costing Rs 70.50 crore annually. They retain lifetime benefits
including subsidised travel, comprehensive healthcare, and other privileges,
regardless of personal wealth. Each election adds permanently to this stock of
obligations, embedding a compounding fiscal burden into the system.
If the Lok Sabha expands to around 850 seats, the Union
ministry could grow from roughly 81 members to nearly 128. A comparable
expansion would follow in the states as assemblies grow. This is not a trivial
change—it enlarges the pool of ministerial positions, the most powerful form of
political reward, without necessarily improving governance.
The visible costs are substantial, but the invisible ones
are even more significant. Distorted policy decisions, delayed projects, and
contracts awarded on political rather than technical criteria impose systemic
inefficiencies. Informal extraction—bribes, commissions, facilitation
fees—pervades everyday governance. Talent is excluded from public life unless
it conforms to this system, while policy is often designed to sustain
dependency rather than enable autonomy. None of these costs appear in budgets,
but they define the real economic and institutional burden of the political
class.
The Federal Alternative: More States, Better Governance
The logical alternative to parliamentary expansion is what
Olson's theory would predict: break the large group into smaller, accountable
units. This means expanding the number of states and devolving more power to
them. Smaller states create smaller groups where citizens can more
realistically organise, monitor, and pressure their local government. Citizens
in a state of 30 million can more effectively demand accountability than those
in a state of 200 million. Their contribution to state-level public goods—schools,
law and order, water—becomes more perceptible.
Devolution concentrates accountability. When a state has
real power over taxes, police, and education, citizens know exactly whom to
blame. That creates a selective incentive to pay attention and vote
strategically. More states would naturally create more chief ministers, more
local media scrutiny, and more inter-state competition—all of which fracture
the central government's monopoly on narrative and patronage.
The evidence from India's state formation experience is
instructive. Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh, formed in November 2000,
have followed sharply different development trajectories.
Uttarakhand—resource-poor but with stable leadership and tourism- and
hydropower-driven growth—far outpaces mineral-rich Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh
on per capita income, literacy, poverty reduction, and investment climate. In
2024-25, Jharkhand's per capita income stands at just Rs 95,000, Chhattisgarh's
at Rs 1.45 lakh, while Uttarakhand's reaches Rs 2.65 lakh—nearly double.
According to NITI Aayog's 2023 data, 36.9 per cent of Jharkhand's population
lives below the poverty line, 29.1 per cent in Chhattisgarh, and only 17.2 per
cent in Uttarakhand.
This disparity reveals that mineral wealth has not
translated into equitable development. The key differentiator appears to be
governance quality, not resource endowment. Uttarakhand's relative success
stems from stable leadership and stronger administrative systems, while
Jharkhand has struggled with political instability—11 chief ministers and three
spells of President's Rule from 2000 to 2024—and corruption.
Telangana's experience further illustrates the challenges of
state formation. A decade after its formation, the Central government under
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been accused of reducing promises to hollow
words. The Bayyaram Steel Plant, promised under the 13th Schedule of the Andhra
Pradesh Reorganisation Act, remains a distant dream. The Krishna River
Management Board and Godavari River Management Board, mandated to ensure
equitable water sharing, had their operational jurisdiction notified only seven
years after formation.
The Capability Trap: Educated Youth and Collective Action
An integrated political economy framework, drawing on both
Olson and Amartya Sen, offers a powerful lens for analysing the political
economy of educated youth unrest in India. Expanded higher education creates a
large latent group with shared entitlements—degrees—but widespread capability
deprivation—inability to secure meaningful work. This generates concentrated
grievances around exam integrity, job scarcity, and institutional
failure—classic non-excludable public goods. A focal crisis, such as exam leaks,
can overcome Olsonian barriers by creating visibility, shared identity, and
self-reinforcing mobilisation via coordination through digital infrastructure.
The NEET-UG paper leaks and subsequent examination
cancellations affected nearly two million candidates, crystallising accumulated
uncertainties around exam credibility and job prospects. What began as protests
against exam credibility rapidly scaled into a visible critical mass of
collective action. The underlying grievance is not merely integrity of exam
systems and scarcity of jobs. It is capability deprivation in Sen's sense.
India has expanded higher-education enrolment dramatically,
with the number of graduates aged 20-29 having risen roughly thirteen-fold
since the early 1980s to around 63 million. Official data show graduate
unemployment at approximately 11.2 per cent overall and closer to 40 per cent
among the youngest cohorts. Only about one in four graduates aged 15-29 holds a
regular salaried job; far fewer enjoy contracts, paid leave, or social
security. More than half of all unemployed persons in India now hold a graduate
degree or higher.
This failure occurs inside a demographic window that will
not remain open indefinitely. Roughly half of India's population is still under
30, with several million young people entering the labour force each year.
After 2030, the working-age share is projected to decline. The productive
absorption of India's educated youth will occur predominantly in
knowledge-intensive and services-based occupations, yet the present shortfall
is structural, not cyclical.
The Irony of Mass Gullibility
The masses buy the "more MPs" solution because
it's simple. "More people = more representatives" sounds like common
sense. It is easy to grasp, requires zero sacrifice, and gives the illusion of
empowerment without actually shifting power. This is classic performative
democracy—cheap outrage, cheap solutions. Social media amplifies this dynamic,
offering the psychological reward of participation without any of the cost of
real organisation. Sharing a post, signing a clicktivism petition, or changing
a profile picture provides the illusion of engagement while leaving the
underlying power structures untouched.
Meanwhile, social media algorithms fracture the public into
echo chambers—farmers versus traders, north versus south, one caste versus
another. A fractured public cannot form the large group needed to demand
systemic change, so they remain trapped in performative outrage. Politicians
deliberately fracture large groups—reserving benefits by sub-caste, region, or
religion—because a divided public is easier to manage with targeted handouts
than a united one demanding systemic change.
The political class in India occupies a structural position
that political scientists have been reluctant to name clearly, perhaps because
it is uncomfortably reminiscent of older vocabulary. Indian capitalism, from
its post-liberalisation acceleration, has required a specific kind of political
mediation. The transition from a state-controlled to a market-oriented economy
did not reduce the importance of the state in economic life—it transformed its
role. Instead of allocating resources through planning, the state now allocates
through regulation, licensing, land, and law. This makes political access, if
anything, more valuable than before.
Reflection
The delimitation debate reveals a profound irony. India is
attempting to deepen democracy by expanding representation, even as the
institutions through which representation operates appear constrained. The
addition of more MPs or MLAs risks expanding the structure without
strengthening its purpose. More seats mean higher campaign expenditure,
increased pressure to mobilise financial resources, and a broader distribution
of political patronage. The political class—which does not produce value but
monetises access to licences, land, contracts, and regulatory discretion—stands
to benefit most from this expansion. The angry voter who wants to punish this
system is, by embracing the "more MPs" solution, inadvertently
reinforcing it. As Olson would predict, the organised incumbents protect their
turf while the diffuse masses free-ride on the illusion of participation. The
tragedy is that the alternative—more states and genuine devolution—would
actually empower citizens by shrinking the group and making each voice matter.
But that requires political will, and political will is precisely what the
system is designed to prevent.
References
- Olson,
Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth,
Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. Yale University Press, 1982.
- "Hollow
Numbers." The Statesman, 22 April 2026.
- "No
to More Politicians: Delimitation Cannot Justify Expanding the Political
Class." The Wire, 22 April 2026.
- "Why
Uttarakhand Outpaced Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh: A Tale of Progress,
Resources, Missed Opportunities." Outlook India, 28
November 2025.
- "Silent
Gerrymandering: How Delimitation Will Erode India's Democracy." Madras
Courier, 16 April 2026.
- "Maths
Vs Myths Of Lok Sabha Expansion: With Hike To 850 Seats Proposed, Which
States Gain & How Much?" News18, 13 April 2026.
- "Economic
Theories of Collective Action, Capabilities and the Political Economy:
Analysing Student Unrest in India." NIPFP Blog, May 2022.
- "Broken
Promises, Denied Rights: How Modi Government Has Failed
Telangana." Telangana Today, 7 May 2026.
- "End
Jammu and Kashmir Statehood Stalemate." Telangana Today,
17 July 2026.
#PublicPolicy #Governance #Federalism #PoliticalEconomy
#India
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