Brazil’s Lost Promise: The Colonial Epic and East Asia’s Economic Ascendancy

Brazil’s Lost Promise: The Colonial Epic and East Asia’s Economic Ascendancy

 

Brazil’s transformation from Portuguese outposts to a vast empire was a saga of ambition, marked by the tragic decimation of indigenous peoples and the brutal reliance on African slavery. By its peaceful independence in 1822, Brazil emerged unified, with Portuguese influence enduring in its monarchy and culture. In the 1950s, Brazil’s wealth, vast lands, and low population pressure outshone war-torn East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam). Yet, East Asia’s revolutionary land reforms, export-driven policies, and equitable institutions fueled a manufacturing 
boom, while Brazil and Argentina stagnated under inefficient policies, entrenched inequalities, and weak governance. This essay weaves Brazil’s colonial creation, its early development, and its failure to match East Asia’s resurgence.

The Genesis of a Giant: Portugal’s Creation of Brazil

When Pedro Álvares Cabral landed on Brazil’s coast in 1500, claiming it for Portugal under the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, few could have imagined the sprawling nation it would become. The treaty allocated Portugal a modest eastern strip of South America, but relentless exploration transformed Brazil into a 8.5-million-square-kilometer colossus. “The Portuguese in Brazil achieved a territorial feat unmatched in their empire,” writes historian Boris Fausto (Fausto, 1999, p. 27). Unlike Portugal’s coastal enclaves in Africa and Asia, Brazil’s interior was penetrated by rugged bandeirantes—Portuguese and mixed-race adventurers from São Paulo—who ventured into the wilderness seeking gold, diamonds, and indigenous slaves. “Bandeirantes were the wild engine of Brazil’s expansion,” notes anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro (Ribeiro, 1995, p. 89).

Navigable rivers like the Amazon and Paraná facilitated this conquest, unlike the Andes’ barriers in Spanish territories. “Brazil’s rivers were highways to the interior,” says geographer John Hemming (Hemming, 1978, p. 56). Economic motives drove the push: brazilwood fueled early trade, sugarcane plantations made Brazil a global sugar hub by the 1600s, and the 1690s gold rush in Minas Gerais, followed by diamonds in Goiás, sparked a frenzy. “Gold turned Brazil into Portugal’s economic lifeline,” writes economist Celso Furtado (Furtado, 1970, p. 67). Strategic needs—countering Dutch (1630–1654) and French incursions—also spurred expansion. “Portugal fortified Brazil to secure its claim,” notes historian Charles Boxer (Boxer, 1962, p. 101).

Financing was eclectic: bandeirantes self-funded risky expeditions, the crown levied taxes like the “royal fifth” (20% on gold), and Jesuit missions, funded by trade and donations, established outposts. “Bandeirantes gambled their fortunes on the frontier,” says Hemming (1978, p. 112). “Jesuits were economic as well as spiritual pioneers,” adds historian Dauril Alden (Alden, 1996, p. 78). By the 18th century, treaties like the 1750 Treaty of Madrid formalized Brazil’s vast boundaries, as Spain ceded ground. “Portugal’s opportunism outmaneuvered Spain,” observes historian Leslie Bethell (Bethell, 1985, p. 45).

The Catastrophe of Indigenous Decimation

Brazil’s creation came at a devastating cost to its indigenous peoples, estimated at 2–11 million in 1500, including Tupi-Guarani, Macro-Jê, and Arawak groups. By 1800, their population had collapsed to under 1 million, ravaged by disease, violence, and enslavement. “European diseases like smallpox were genocidal,” writes anthropologist John Monteiro (Monteiro, 1994, p. 34). Smallpox, measles, and influenza decimated up to 90% of some communities within decades. “Disease was the silent conqueror,” notes historian Barbara Ganson (Ganson, 2003, p. 56).

Violence was equally brutal. Bandeirantes raided villages, enslaving thousands for plantations and mines. “Slaving expeditions depopulated entire regions,” says Ribeiro (1995, p. 102). The 1754–1756 Guarani War crushed indigenous resistance, killing or displacing thousands. “Indigenous groups were fragmented, no match for Portuguese arms,” observes Ganson (2003, p. 67). Jesuit missions, while offering some protection, disrupted traditional cultures by forcing conversions and resettlement. “Missions eroded indigenous autonomy under a guise of salvation,” says historian James Schofield Saeger (Saeger, 2000, p. 45). Survivors were marginalized to remote areas or absorbed into a mestiço (mixed-race) population, leaving Brazil a Portuguese-dominated landscape. “The indigenous collapse cleared the way for colonial control,” notes Monteiro (1994, p. 78).

African Slavery: The Brutal Engine of Growth

With indigenous labor decimated, African slavery became Brazil’s economic foundation. Between the 16th and 19th centuries, over 4 million Africans were forcibly transported to Brazil, the largest number in the Americas. “Brazil’s economy was built on African suffering,” writes historian Herbert Klein (Klein, 2010, p. 89). Sugarcane plantations in the northeast, gold mines in Minas Gerais, and later coffee estates relied on enslaved labor. By 1822, slaves comprised 30% of Brazil’s 4 million population, with another 20% free Afro-Brazilians (Conrad, 1986, p. 112).

The transatlantic slave trade, financed by Portuguese and European merchants, was a global enterprise. “The trade linked Brazil to Africa and Europe in a grim commerce,” says historian Joseph Miller (Miller, 1988, p. 78). Enslaved Africans, primarily from Angola and West Africa, faced 10–20% mortality during the Middle Passage. “The human toll was staggering,” notes economist Robert Fogel (Fogel, 1989, p. 45). On plantations, life expectancy was seven years, with brutal conditions driving sugar exports to 30,000 tons annually by 1650 (Schwartz, 1985, p. 101). “Sugar was Brazil’s first gold,” says historian Stuart Schwartz (Schwartz, 1985, p. 89). The gold rush saw Africans dominate Minas Gerais’ population by 70% in 1750 (Bergad, 1999, p. 56). Slavery entrenched a racial hierarchy, excluding Afro-Brazilians from power. “Slavery’s legacy is Brazil’s enduring inequality,” observes sociologist Edward Telles (Telles, 2004, p. 34).

Early Development: From Outposts to Empire

Brazil’s early development was a story of economic booms and centralized governance. The northeast dominated the 16th–17th centuries, with Salvador as the capital and sugar exports fueling wealth. The 1690s gold rush shifted focus to Minas Gerais, supplying 50% of Europe’s gold by 1750 (Furtado, 1970, p. 78). “Gold reshaped Brazil’s geography,” says economist Marcelo de Paiva Abreu (Abreu, 2001, p. 45). Rio de Janeiro became the capital in 1763, reflecting the south’s rise. “Brazil’s unity was its strength,” notes historian Roderick Barman (Barman, 1988, p. 56).

The Portuguese crown tightly controlled Brazil, using its wealth to fund imperial ambitions. “Brazil was Portugal’s cash cow,” says historian Kenneth Maxwell (Maxwell, 2003, p. 67). Jesuit missions and bandeirante expeditions integrated the interior, while slavery sustained growth. Early nationalist stirrings, like the 1789 Inconfidência Mineira, reflected creole discontent. “The seeds of independence were sown in Minas,” writes historian Thomas Skidmore (Skidmore, 1999, p. 34). The 1808 arrival of the Portuguese court, fleeing Napoleon, transformed Brazil into the empire’s capital, with new institutions like a printing press and Bank of Brazil. “The court made Brazil a co-equal kingdom,” says Bethell (1985, p. 89).

Independence: A Peaceful Revolution

Brazil’s independence in 1822 was a masterstroke of continuity, avoiding Spanish America’s bloody wars. When João VI returned to Portugal in 1821, his son Pedro stayed as regent. The Portuguese Cortes’ attempt to recolonize Brazil—demanding Pedro’s return and restricting trade—sparked elite resistance. “The Cortes misjudged Brazil’s resolve,” notes historian Jeffrey Needell (Needell, 2006, p. 45). Pedro’s “Fico” declaration on January 9, 1822, and his September 7 proclamation of “Independence or Death!” at Ipiranga made him Emperor Pedro I. “Pedro unified elites under a monarchy,” says Skidmore (1999, p. 56). Conflicts in loyalist provinces like Bahia were subdued by 1823, with British support securing Portugal’s recognition in 1825 for a 2-million-pound indemnity. “Britain’s diplomacy opened Brazil to trade,” writes Abreu (2001, p. 78). The decimated indigenous population and fear of slave revolts kept these groups sidelined. “Elites dreaded a Haitian uprising,” says historian Robert Conrad (Conrad, 1986, p. 101).

Portuguese Influence: 1822–1922

Post-independence, Portuguese influence persisted, unlike the U.S.’s break from Britain. The monarchy (1822–1889) preserved Portuguese governance, with the 1824 Constitution mirroring European models. “Brazil’s monarchy was a Portuguese transplant,” says historian José Murilo de Carvalho (Carvalho, 2002, p. 34). Portuguese elites and 1.5 million immigrants dominated politics and trade (Fausto, 1999, p. 123). The Portuguese language unified Brazil, with 99% fluency by 1922. “Portuguese was the nation’s glue,” notes linguist John Milton (Milton, 2003, p. 21). Catholicism, the state religion until 1889, shaped culture. “The Church carried Portuguese traditions,” says Maxwell (2003, p. 78).

Brazilian identity, however, blended African (e.g., Candomblé) and indigenous (e.g., Indianismo) influences. “Brazil’s culture was a vibrant hybrid,” says anthropologist Lilia Schwarcz (Schwarcz, 1999, p. 89). By 1922, the Modernist movement and non-Portuguese immigration (Italians, Japanese) diluted Portuguese dominance, though language and elite culture endured. “Brazil fused Portuguese roots with local dynamism,” observes Schwarcz (1999, p. 101). The U.S., by contrast, forged a distinct identity through diverse immigration. “America rejected British aristocracy; Brazil embraced Portuguese monarchy,” says historian Peter Smith (Smith, 2008, p. 56).

Brazil’s Golden Moment: The 1950s

In the 1950s, Brazil stood on the cusp of greatness. Its GDP per capita ($1,672 PPP) surpassed Japan ($1,346), South Korea ($770), Taiwan ($900), China ($448), and Vietnam ($600) (Maddison Project, 2020). With 51 million people across 8.5 million km² (6 people/km²), Brazil faced less population pressure than Japan (220/km²) or China (50/km²). “Brazil’s resources were a global envy,” says economist Albert Fishlow (Fishlow, 2011, p. 34). São Paulo’s 80% electrification by 1960 outpaced South Korea’s 50% (World Bank, 1965). East Asia, scarred by wars and colonial rule, seemed far behind. “Japan and China were in tatters,” notes economist Dwight Perkins (Perkins, 2001, p. 67).

The Paradox: East Asia’s Triumph

By 1990, East Asia had eclipsed Brazil and Argentina: Japan’s GDP per capita reached $23,000, South Korea’s $6,500, Taiwan’s $8,000, China’s $1,500, and Vietnam’s $1,200, while Brazil stagnated at $4,000 and Argentina at $4,300 (Maddison Project, 2020). “East Asia turned adversity into triumph; Latin America squandered its lead,” says economist Dani Rodrik (Rodrik, 2007, p. 45). This paradox stems from divergent land policies, economic strategies, social structures, education, institutions, and global integration.

Land Reform: The Great Divide

East Asia’s land reforms, catalyzed by violent upheavals, were transformative. Japan’s 1946–1949 reform, driven by U.S. occupation, redistributed 38% of farmland (1.9 million hectares) to 4.7 million farmers, slashing tenancy from 46% to 10% (Dore, 1959, p. 56). South Korea’s 1949–1950 reform gave 50% of farmland to 1.6 million households, reducing tenancy from 49% to 7% (Shin, 1998, p. 78). Taiwan’s 1949–1953 reform redistributed 43% to 600,000 farmers (Koo, 1968, p. 45). China’s 1949–1952 reform gave 47 million hectares to 300 million peasants, eliminating tenancy (Perkins, 1975, p. 101). Vietnam’s 1953–1956 reform (north) and post-1975 efforts gave 3.3 million hectares to 2 million households (Moise, 1983, p. 67). “Land reform was East Asia’s economic spark,” says economist Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz, 2001, p. 89).

These reforms boosted agricultural productivity: Japan’s rice yields rose 30% (2.3 to 3.0 tons/ha, 1945–1960), South Korea’s doubled (1.9 to 3.8 million tons, 1950–1970), Taiwan’s rose 40% (1.5 to 2.1 tons/ha), China’s grain output grew 44% (113 to 163 million tons, 1949–1957), and Vietnam’s rice yields increased 20% (1.2 to 1.5 tons/ha) (FAO, 1980). “Productivity gains freed labor and capital,” notes economist Alice Amsden (Amsden, 1989, p. 78). Reduced inequality—Japan’s land Gini fell from 0.65 to 0.35, China’s from 0.70 to 0.30—created broad consumer markets and social stability (World Bank, 1980). “Equity fueled East Asia’s industrial boom,” says economist Amartya Sen (Sen, 1999, p. 34).

Brazil and Argentina, however, preserved colonial land structures. In Brazil, 1.6% of landowners held 51% of farmland (land Gini 0.85), with 50% of rural households landless (Fausto, 1999, p. 134). Argentina’s 2% controlled 50% (land Gini 0.80), with 70% of rural workers landless (Taylor, 1997, p. 78). “Latin America’s elites blocked reform to cling to power,” says historian John Coatsworth (Coatsworth, 1998, p. 45). Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute redistributed <1% of farmland, and Argentina’s 1948 rent controls affected <5% (IBGE, 1980; Solberg, 1987, p. 101). Low yields—Brazil’s coffee at 0.6 tons/ha, Argentina’s wheat at 1.2 tons/ha—limited industrial capital (FAO, 1965). “Land concentration choked rural progress,” says economist Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Cardoso, 1979, p. 101). Rural poverty (60% in Brazil, 40% in Argentina) constrained markets, and labor remained tied to plantations, stunting urban industry (IBGE, 1960; INDEC, 1960).

Economic Policies: ISI vs. EOI

Brazil and Argentina pursued import substitution industrialization (ISI), protecting domestic industries with tariffs and subsidies. Brazil’s GDP grew 7% annually (1950s–1960s), driven by steel and automotive sectors under Juscelino Kubitschek, but inefficiencies emerged. “ISI bred uncompetitive firms,” says economist Eliana Cardoso (Cardoso, 1991, p. 67). By 1970, manufactured exports were 5% of Brazil’s total, with coffee dominating at 50% (IBGE, 1975). Argentina’s ISI under Juan Perón focused on textiles, but beef/wheat exports (60% in 1960) limited diversification (Rock, 1987, p. 89). “Argentina’s ISI prioritized urban elites over broad growth,” notes historian David Rock (Rock, 1987, p. 101). Debt soared—Brazil’s from $3.9 billion in 1973 to $120 billion by 1985, Argentina faced crises in 1959 and 1975 (World Bank, 1985). “ISI’s debt trap crippled Latin America,” says economist Rudiger Dornbusch (Dornbusch, 1993, p. 56).

East Asia’s export-oriented industrialization (EOI) was a game-changer. Japan’s exports rose from $1.3 billion to $55 billion (1950–1970), South Korea’s from $33 million to $10 billion (1960–1980), Taiwan’s from $164 million to $5.6 billion, China’s from $9.8 billion to $182 billion (1978–2000), and Vietnam’s from $2.4 billion to $14.5 billion (1990–2000) (World Bank, 2000). “EOI forced East Asia to innovate,” says Amsden (1989, p. 89). Governments like South Korea’s Park Chung-hee used land reform surpluses to fund infrastructure (e.g., Pohang Steel), ensuring global competitiveness. “State discipline was East Asia’s edge,” notes political scientist Robert Wade (Wade, 1990, p. 78). U.S. aid—$13 billion for Japan, $2.5 billion for South Korea—bolstered early growth (Perkins, 2001, p. 89). “East Asia seized global markets; Latin America hid behind tariffs,” says economist Anne Krueger (Krueger, 1990, p. 67).

Social Structures and Inequality

East Asia’s land reforms reduced inequality, creating inclusive markets. Japan’s income Gini fell from 0.50 to 0.35, South Korea’s from 0.45 to 0.34, Taiwan’s from 0.56 to 0.32, China’s land Gini from 0.70 to 0.30, and Vietnam’s from 0.65 to 0.40 (World Bank, 1980; Perkins, 1975). “Equity drove consumer demand,” says Sen (1999, p. 45). Brazil’s income Gini (0.57) and Argentina’s (0.45) reflected persistent rural poverty—60% and 40% of households, respectively (IBGE, 1960; INDEC, 1960). “Latin America’s inequality stifled markets,” says Cardoso (1979, p. 112). Brazil’s colonial legacy—rooted in slavery and elite dominance—created a rigid hierarchy. “Brazil’s social structure was a plantation prison,” notes sociologist Edward Telles (Telles, 2004, p. 45). Argentina’s estancias similarly concentrated wealth. “Argentina’s oligarchs hoarded prosperity,” says historian Alan Taylor (Taylor, 1997, p. 89). East Asia’s social cohesion, driven by Confucian values and reforms, contrasted with Latin America’s fragmentation. “East Asia’s unity fueled progress,” says anthropologist Ruth Benedict (Benedict, 1946, p. 101).

Education and Human Capital

East Asia’s investment in education was transformative. By 1970, literacy reached 90–100% in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, 70% in China, and 65% in Vietnam (UNESCO, 1975). South Korea’s primary enrollment rose from 59% to 94% (1950–1970). “Education built East Asia’s workforce,” says economist T.W. Schultz (Schultz, 1980, p. 67). Technical training aligned with industrial needs, enabling Japan’s electronics and South Korea’s shipbuilding booms. “Skills were East Asia’s currency,” notes economist Gary Becker (Becker, 1993, p. 78).

Brazil’s literacy was 49% in 1950, reaching 74% by 1990, with only 0.1% in universities (IBGE, 1990). Argentina’s literacy (86% in 1950) was higher, but rural and technical education lagged. “Brazil’s elitist education left it unready for high-tech industries,” says economist Claudio Frischtak (Frischtak, 1994, p. 89). Rural disparities—60% of Brazil’s rural population illiterate in 1960—further constrained progress (IBGE, 1960). “Latin America neglected human capital,” says economist Ricardo Hausmann (Hausmann, 2015, p. 56). East Asia’s meritocratic culture, rooted in Confucian values, drove educational investment, unlike Latin America’s hierarchical traditions. “Confucian discipline outshone Brazil’s elitism,” says Benedict (1946, p. 112).

Political Stability and Institutions

East Asia’s stable governance enabled long-term planning. Japan’s LDP-dominated democracy, South Korea and Taiwan’s authoritarian regimes, China’s communist state, and Vietnam’s post-1975 unification ensured policy continuity. “Disciplined institutions drove East Asia’s miracles,” says political scientist Stephan Haggard (Haggard, 1990, p. 78). Japan’s MITI and South Korea’s Economic Planning Board coordinated development, minimizing corruption. “East Asia’s bureaucracies were meritocratic machines,” notes economist Daron Acemoglu (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 67).

Brazil’s 1964 coup and Argentina’s coups (1955, 1966, 1976) caused volatility, with Brazil’s hyperinflation (2,947% in 1990) and Argentina’s crises (e.g., 1989) disrupting growth (World Bank, 1990). “Latin America’s instability killed consistency,” says Dornbusch (1993, p. 78). Patronage and corruption plagued institutions. “Brazil’s patronage was its Achilles’ heel,” says political scientist Frances Hagopian (Hagopian, 1996, p. 89). Argentina’s elite-dominated politics similarly stifled reform. “Argentina’s oligarchy choked progress,” says historian Tulio Halperín Donghi (Donghi, 1993, p. 101).

Global Integration

East Asia leveraged global markets, with U.S. aid ($13 billion for Japan, $2.5 billion for South Korea) and trade fueling growth (Perkins, 2001, p. 101). “East Asia rode globalization’s wave,” says economist Jeffrey Sachs (Sachs, 1995, p. 67). Brazil and Argentina’s ISI isolated them, with commodity exports (coffee 50% in Brazil, beef 60% in Argentina) dominating (IBGE, 1975; Rock, 1987). “Latin America missed global markets,” says Krueger (1990, p. 78).

Reflection: A Tale of Divergent Destinies

Brazil’s journey from a Portuguese colony to a vast empire is a saga of ambition and tragedy, marked by indigenous decimation and African slavery. Its peaceful independence preserved unity, but the failure to enact land reform, unlike East Asia’s revolutionary changes, entrenched inequality, stifling growth. “Land reform was East Asia’s catalyst,” says Acemoglu (2009, p. 89). Brazil and Argentina’s elites, rooted in colonial hierarchies, preserved wealth over progress. “Latin America’s oligarchs chose stasis,” notes Halperín Donghi (1993, p. 112). East Asia’s EOI, equitable social structures, and robust institutions contrasted with Latin America’s inefficient ISI, rigid hierarchies, and weak governance. “East Asia’s discipline outpaced Brazil’s chaos,” says economist Paul Krugman (Krugman, 1994, p. 101). Education and global integration further widened the gap. “Human capital and markets were East Asia’s trump cards,” says Sachs (1995, p. 78). Brazil’s recent progress—poverty reduction, democratic stability—offers hope, but inequality (Gini 0.49 in 2020) persists (World Bank, 2020). “Brazil must embrace equity and competition,” advises Hausmann (2015, p. 67). This tale underscores that resources alone cannot ensure prosperity; it demands reform, vision, and resilience.

References

• Acemoglu, D. (2009). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton University Press.
• Alden, D. (1996). The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus in Portugal. Stanford University Press.
• Amsden, A. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant. Oxford University Press.
• Abreu, M. de P. (2001). The Brazilian Economy. Routledge.
• Balassa, B. (1985). Change and Challenge in the World Economy. Macmillan.
• Barman, R. (1988). Brazil: The Forging of a Nation. Stanford University Press.
• Becker, G. (1993). Human Capital. University of Chicago Press.
• Benedict, R. (1946). The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Houghton Mifflin.
• Bergad, L. (1999). Slavery and the Demographic History of Brazil. Cambridge University Press.
• Bethell, L. (1985). The Cambridge History of Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
• Boxer, C. R. (1962). The Golden Age of Brazil. University of California Press.
• Cardoso, E. (1991). Brazil’s Economic Crisis. Brookings Institution.
• Cardoso, F. H. (1979). Dependency and Development in Latin America. University of California Press.
• Carvalho, J. M. de. (2002). A Formação das Almas. Companhia das Letras.
• Chang, H.-J. (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder. Anthem Press.
• Coatsworth, J. (1998). Economic and Institutional Trajectories in Latin America. Harvard University Press.
• Conrad, R. (1986). World of Sorrow: The African Slave Trade to Brazil. LSU Press.
• Dore, R. (1959). Land Reform in Japan. Oxford University Press.
• Dornbusch, R. (1993). Stabilization, Debt, and Reform. MIT Press.
• Fausto, B. (1999). A Concise History of Brazil. Cambridge University Press.
• Fishlow, A. (2011). Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985. Brookings Institution.
• Fogel, R. (1989). Without Consent or Contract. W.W. Norton.
• Frischtak, C. (1994). Brazil’s Industrial Policy. World Bank.
• Furtado, C. (1970). Economic Development of Latin America. Cambridge University Press.
• Ganson, B. (2003). The Guaraní Under Spanish Rule. Stanford University Press.
• Haggard, S. (1990). Pathways from the Periphery. Cornell University Press.
• Hagopian, F. (1996). Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil. Cambridge University Press.
• Halperín Donghi, T. (1993). The Contemporary History of Latin America. Duke University Press.
• Hausmann, R. (2015). Brazil’s Economic Challenges. Harvard Kennedy School.
• Hemming, J. (1978). Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians. Harvard University Press.
• IBGE. (1960, 1975, 1980, 1990). Censo Demográfico. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.
• INDEC. (1960). Censo Nacional. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos.
• Klein, H. (2010). The Atlantic Slave Trade. Cambridge University Press.
• Koo, A. (1968). The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development. Praeger.
• Krueger, A. (1990). Perspectives on Trade and Development. University of Chicago Press.
• Krugman, P. (1994). Peddling Prosperity. W.W. Norton.
• Maddison Project. (2020). Historical Statistics of the World Economy. University of Groningen.
• Maxwell, K. (2003). Naked Tropics. Routledge.
• Miller, J. (1988). Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade. University of Wisconsin Press.
• Milton, J. (2003). The Portuguese Language in Brazil. Routledge.
• Moise, E. (1983). Land Reform in China and North Vietnam. University of North Carolina Press.
• Monteiro, J. (1994). Negros da Terra. Companhia das Letras.
• Needell, J. (2006). The Party of Order. Stanford University Press.
• Perkins, D. (1975). China’s Modern Economy in Historical Perspective. Stanford University Press.
• Perkins, D. (2001). The East Asian Miracle. World Bank.
• Ribeiro, D. (1995). The Brazilian People. University Press of Florida.
• Rock, D. (1987). Argentina, 1516–1987. University of California Press.
• Rodrik, D. (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes. Princeton University Press.
• Sachs, J. (1995). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth. NBER.
• Saeger, J. S. (2000). The Chaco Mission Frontier. University of Arizona Press.
• Schwartz, S. (1985). Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society. Cambridge University Press.
• Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press.
• Shin, G.-W. (1998). The Politics of Land Reform in South Korea. Harvard University Press.
• Skidmore, T. (1999). Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. Oxford University Press.
• Smith, P. (2008). Comparing the Americas. Routledge.
• Solberg, C. (1987). The Prairies and the Pampas. Stanford University Press.
• Stiglitz, J. (2001). Globalization and Its Discontents. W.W. Norton.
• Taylor, A. (1997). Argentina’s Economic History. Cambridge University Press.
• Telles, E. (2004). Race in Another America. Princeton University Press.
• Wade, R. (1990). Governing the Market. Princeton University Press.
• World Bank. (1965, 1980, 1985, 1990, 2000, 2020). World Development Indicators.