The Betrayed East: Policy, Partition, and the Perpetual Decline of
India's Industrial Heartland
Eastern India's
descent from colonial-era industrial prominence to post-independence
marginalization is a poignant tale of historical shocks and policy blunders.
Resource-rich states like West Bengal, Bihar (including Jharkhand), and Odisha
inherited vast mineral wealth but suffered deindustrialization under British
rule, the devastating 1943 Bengal Famine, and the 1947 Partition's economic
fractures. The 1952 Freight Equalisation Policy (FEP) marked a critical
inflection, subsidizing mineral transport and diverting industries to western
and southern states, causing capital flight, unemployment, and exacerbated
social woes like corruption and Maoism. Comparative data reveals stark
disparities: eastern industrial shares tumbled from 35% nationally in 1950 to
15% by 1990, while per capita incomes lagged 30-50% behind western peers.
Policymakers, driven by ideological optimism or deliberate trade-offs for
national equity, overlooked these vulnerabilities. This essay delves deeply
into these dynamics, critiquing with evidence and highlighting avoidable
divergences.
The Colonial Foundations: Promise Amid Exploitation
(1930-1947)
Imagine the eastern plains of India in the 1930s: coal mines
humming in Bihar's Raniganj fields, jute mills lining the Hooghly River in
Bengal, and iron ore glinting from Odisha's hills. This was no backwater; it
was the empire's industrial engine, fueling Britain's coffers while laying
seeds for modern growth. Yet, colonial policies had already begun an insidious
deindustrialization, reducing India's global industrial share from 25% in the
mid-18th century to a paltry 2% by 1900. As historian Irfan Habib noted,
"The British systematically suppressed Indian manufactures to protect
their own industries," channeling eastern resources like Bihar's coal—90%
of India's reserves—abroad rather than fostering local value addition.
Economist Amiya Kumar Bagchi echoed this, stating, "Colonial rule imposed
a drain of wealth that starved eastern India of capital for technological
upgrades."
The Great Depression amplified the rot. Jute prices crashed
50-60%, shuttering mills in Kolkata and unleashing unemployment in Bengal's
agrarian belts. "The Depression exposed the vulnerability of eastern
India's commodity-dependent economy," observed economic historian
Tirthankar Roy, highlighting how unlike Bombay's diversified cotton sector,
Bengal's jute monopoly left it exposed. Agrarian systems worsened the plight;
the zamindari land tenure enforced crushing taxes, leading to peasant indebtedness.
As Jawaharlal Nehru later reflected in The Discovery of India, "The
colonial land revenue system turned fertile eastern lands into zones of
perpetual poverty."
World War II brought a fleeting boom but deeper scars.
Bihar's TISCO steel plant ramped up for Allied needs, yet inflation and
resource diversion crippled civilian sectors. Then came the 1943 Bengal Famine,
a man-made catastrophe killing 2-3 million. Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate and
famine scholar, argued, "The famine was not due to food shortage but
policy failure—hoarding, price controls, and wartime exports." Its
long-term toll was devastating: depleted workforce, eroded health, and shattered
trust in institutions. "The famine's aftermath accelerated poverty and
inequality," Sen added, noting how it reduced Bengal's labor productivity
by 20-30% in subsequent years. Historian Madhusree Mukerjee concurred:
"Churchill's policies contributed to the famine by prioritizing military
supplies over civilian needs." Data underscores this: Bengal's per capita
income, above national average in the 1930s, stagnated, with industrial output
flatlining pre-1947.
By 1947, eastern India retained 25-30% of national
manufacturing, but fragility loomed. "Colonial exploitation left a legacy
of uneven development," said economist Jean Drèze, presaging the region's
vulnerability.
Partition's Cleavage: A Shock, Not a Doom (1947-1950s)
The 1947 Partition sliced through Bengal like a surgeon's
knife gone awry, severing economic lifelines and igniting chaos. West Bengal
kept Kolkata's mills but lost 80% of jute fields to East Pakistan, halving
production and crashing exports. "Partition will be sowing the seeds of
future serious trouble," warned Cyril Radcliffe, the boundary commission
chair. Refugee influx—4-5 million Hindus—strained resources, inflating land
prices 30-50% and sparking unrest. Bihar absorbed migrants indirectly,
disrupting mineral trade via severed rivers.
Yet, this was no fatal blow. "Partition's impacts were
profound but regionally contained," noted historian Joya Chatterji, with
West Bengal's GDP rebounding by 1955. Data shows eastern industrial capacity at
48% of engineering output in early 1950s. "The region was poised for
recovery," said economist Pranab Bardhan, crediting the First Five-Year
Plan's aid. Nehru himself acknowledged, "Partition disrupted but did not
destroy Bengal's industrial base."
Labor militancy emerged, rooted in postwar grievances.
Communist-led strikes in West Bengal's jute sector resisted layoffs, but
deterred investment. "Workers contested nationalist leadership, placing
labor at the forefront," observed historian Sarmistha Dutta Gupta.
"Militancy was a response to exploitation," added labor scholar
Ranajit Das Gupta.
The FEP Pivot: From Advantage to Liability (1952 Onward)
The 1952 Freight Equalisation Policy (FEP) arrived like a
well-intentioned storm, promising balanced growth but unleashing a torrent of
unintended consequences that transformed eastern India's resource bounty from a
competitive edge into a burdensome liability. By subsidizing rail freight for
key minerals—coal, iron ore, steel, cement, and eventually 13 items—the policy
capped transport costs at uniform rates, erasing the 20-50% cost advantages of
locating industries near eastern mines. This commoditized raw materials,
allowing factories in distant regions to access them cheaply, while eastern
states bore extraction costs without downstream benefits. "The policy hurt
mineral-rich states like Bihar and Odisha," per expert consensus,
systematically redirecting industrial momentum westward and southward. Finance
Minister Nirmala Sitharaman later admitted, "This policy had disastrous
effects on eastern India, weakening incentives for industries near mines."
A Cornell University study quantified the fallout: the FES, enacted in 1956 and
expanded, led to negligible short-term shifts but long-run declines in iron-
and steel-intensive manufacturing in eastern districts, with employment
dropping 15-20% relative to counterfactuals by the 1970s-80s. The study further
revealed that FES "achieved exactly the opposite of its purported goal,
exacerbating inequality between western and eastern India," with eastern
regions seeing a persistent 10-15% reduction in manufacturing activity even
after repeal.
Critically, the FEP's distortions are evident in comparative
regional data. Pre-FEP, the combined manufacturing output of Bihar, Odisha,
Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal surpassed that of Punjab, Gujarat, and Tamil
Nadu, with eastern states dominating 92% of national iron/steel output in the
early 1950s. Post-FEP, this plummeted to under 50% by 1990 as new plants
bypassed the region, while overall industrial GDP share for the east fell from
35% in 1950 to 15% by 1990. Per capita income gaps ballooned—Bihar's at just
40% of Gujarat's by 1980, and eastern growth rates lagged 1-2% annually behind
western peers through the 1980s. In contrast, beneficiaries like Maharashtra,
Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu flourished: these western and southern states captured
25% gains in auto and machinery sectors by the 1970s, with their combined
industrial output overtaking the east's pre-FEP dominance. By the 1960s,
Maharashtra and Gujarat's per capita incomes exceeded the national average,
growing at rates 1.5-2 times faster than Bihar or West Bengal, per historical
analyses. "States like Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu emerged as
major beneficiaries of the freight equalization scheme," notes a detailed
Substack analysis, as FEP enabled market-proximate hubs to import eastern
minerals at subsidized rates, fostering clusters in Bombay and Madras. Southern
cement manufacturers particularly gained, with limestone transport equalized,
boosting Tamil Nadu's industry. Even thermal power in Tamil Nadu remains
dependent on eastern coal subsidies' legacy.
This pivot wasn't merely economic; it entrenched a
"resource curse," as academic Stuart Corbridge described, where
eastern states became mere exporters, discouraging local infrastructure and
value addition. Journalist Kanchan Gupta alleged Nehru's bias: "Eastern
states were kept backward." Counterfactual models suggest eastern
manufacturing could have expanded 1.5-2% annually faster without FEP,
potentially closing 30-40% of the north-south gap. Even after partial repeal in
1993, agglomeration in the west proved sticky, with eastern recovery
limited—e.g., West Bengal's industrial share lingering at 5% today. Critiques
abound: while FEP aimed for equity, it inefficiently subsidized transport
(costs equivalent to 10-15% of mineral values), benefiting urban elites in
beneficiary states at the expense of rural eastern miners. A 1977 government
report downplayed subsidies as "only a small proportion of firms' final
output prices," but econometric evidence contradicts this, showing
amplified disparities. Overall, FEP's legacy is one of distorted geography, per
Oxford talks, where short-term dispersal bred long-term inefficiencies.
Flight of Capital: Breeding Corruption and Maoism
Deindustrialization under FEP triggered a vicious exodus of
capital, industries, and jobs from the east, creating economic vacuums that
amplified latent social ills into rampant corruption, Maoism (Naxalism), and
broader dysfunctions like inequality and migration. This flight wasn't
abstract; it manifested in tangible declines: eastern investment grew at half
the national rate in the 1950s-60s, with manufacturing shares plummeting and
unemployment soaring among rural and semi-skilled workers. "Economic deprivation
is a catalyst for Maoism," per a European Foundation for South Asian
Studies report, as resource extraction benefited outsiders while displacing
locals without jobs. Naxalism, igniting in West Bengal's 1967 Naxalbari
uprising, thrived in this void, spreading across eastern and central
India—Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, West Bengal—where stagnation fueled grievances
over landlessness and exploitation. "Poverty and exploitation fuel
insurgency," said Vajiram & Ravi analysts, with insurgents targeting
"exploitative" mining firms. At its 2008 peak, Naxalism affected nine
states and 40% of India's landmass in the "Red Corridor," accounting
for 85% of left-wing extremist incidents nationwide. Comparative data
highlights eastern concentration: between 2004-2014, 16,463 incidents occurred,
predominantly in eastern/central belts, versus sporadic presence in southern
Andhra Pradesh or western Maharashtra. By 2025, fatalities reached 255, mostly
in eastern districts, per ACLED data, though overall violence declined 77% from
2010 peaks due to counterinsurgency. "Insurgents target exploitative
development," noted a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, with economic
costs in billions from infrastructure sabotage. Critically, while Naxalism
existed elsewhere, its intensity in the east—seven core states at
height—stemmed from FEP-induced underdevelopment, contrasting with
industrialized west's relative stability. A NDU Press study emphasizes,
"The socioeconomic conditions underpinning Naxalism remained largely
unchanged," with deindustrialization perpetuating poverty that Maoists
exploited. An MPRA paper adds, "The impact of Naxalism on economic growth
and development is very severe," disrupting mining in Jharkhand and
agriculture in Bihar. IWU analysis links it to labor income shocks and mining
rates, amplified in deindustrialized east. CTC report notes, "India's
decades of COIN experience" show socioeconomic roots in eastern neglect.
VIF highlights, "The Maoist conflict has extensively affected forest
produce market and mining in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand." theIAShub warns,
"It affects the core of society—disrupting development, destroying
infrastructure." RJHSS states, "Naxalism is the most significant
political movement since independence," rooted in economic
marginalization. ResearchGate adds, "Sudden rise of Maoist ideology...
against social discrimination," tied to deindustrialization.
Corruption, too, metastasized in this economic hollowing, as
fiscal shortfalls and patronage networks filled governance gaps. "Bihar
has been India's most corrupt state," per a 1974 New York Times report,
with indices showing escalation from 0.41 (1990-95) to 0.88 (2006-10), far
higher than Gujarat's 0.67. "Fiscal shortfalls incentivize graft,"
said a Wire report, with eastern states reliant on central aid fostering
cronyism. In West Bengal, "cut money" scandals thrive due to state
overreach, per Spontaneous Order analyses. "Corruption arises from
expanded state power," added experts. Historical comparisons reveal
eastern skew: Rajasthan and Maharashtra led in reported cases (773 in MH 2022),
but Bihar's notoriety under Lalu Yadav (1990-2005) tied to deindustrialization,
contrasting southern states' lower indices amid growth. A 2018 survey ranked
Telangana and Andhra high, but eastern persistence links to poverty. Wikipedia
notes, "Causes include excessive regulations," amplified in underdeveloped
east. Transparency.org ranks India low, with eastern states like Bihar at 75%
corruption perception in 2023 vs. Gujarat's lower 40-50%. Reddit maps show
Bihar deep red. Trading Economics: India averaged 78 in CPI, but regional data
shows Bihar worse. CFR: Ranked 94th in 2013, with corruption tied to
bureaucracy in poor states. IJSSER: "Bihar faced... widespread corruption,
hampering development." Scroll.in: 79% respondents cited corruption as
issue in low-investment Bihar vs. Gujarat. NACC: "Level of corruption...
predictors of policy implementation," higher in east. Hindu: India dropped
to 38 in CPI 2024, eastern drag evident.
Broader ills cascaded: mass migration from Bihar (millions
annually), family breakdowns, and communal tensions. "BIMARU label
underscores policy-induced poverty," per a Medium essay, with eastern per
capita incomes 30-50% below western averages by 1990. Critiques note
non-determinism—colonial legacies and politics contributed—but economic flight
reinforced ills disproportionately in the east.
Policymakers' Blind Spots and Trade-Offs
Why did 1950s policymakers, led by Nehru and the Planning
Commission, fail to foresee FEP's ravages on the east? A blend of data gaps,
ideological fervor, and deliberate trade-offs for "national good"
obscured vulnerabilities like Partition scars and labor unrest. Early
statistics were rudimentary, per the 1951 Central Statistical Organisation,
viewing famine and refugee crises as transient. "Planners assumed uniform
capacity," said Bardhan. Nehru's socialism posited, "Central planning
can override inequities." A 1957 report promoted dispersal without
modeling losses, claiming subsidies "amounted to only a small proportion
of firms' final output prices." Nehru's rationale emphasized
"balanced regional development by stimulating industrial development in
places which were far," per historical accounts. As Youth Ki Awaaz notes,
"FEP was adopted... to facilitate equal growth of industries all over the
country," reflecting optimism that state intervention could heal colonial
divides. Scroll.in adds, "The policy was adopted in 1948 with the
intention that industry could develop all over the country." Critiques in
the 1950s were muted, but Quora discussions highlight early concerns:
"Freight equalization policy was bad for both the country and the states,"
with raw material-rich areas losing out. Reddit users echo, "The
government policy... further marginalized Bihar and UP."
Yet, trade-offs were conscious: FEP neutralized eastern
edges to spur growth elsewhere, benefiting Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil
Nadu—whose industrial shares surged as east's declined. "Disperse
industries for equity," per the report. "Nehru's policy nullified
eastern advantages," experts note. Pranab Mukherjee lamented,
"Freight equalization hit Bihar growth," endorsing that it
"increased the inequality among states especially in the eastern
part." He added, "This led to the loss of the natural advantage of the
region. As a result, the spirit of entrepreneurship could not flourish."
OpIndia reports, "The late President Pranab Mukherjee supported the
long-standing allegation." Youth Ki Awaaz: "Former President...
described... a miscalculated policy." Critiques highlight flaws: while
western per capita grew faster (Gujarat 1.5x national by 1980s), east lagged,
per EAC-PM data. "It was a flawed pursuit of social justice,"
concluded Corbridge, prioritizing macro-equity over efficiency. South First:
"The freight equalization policy... remained in force until 1993 to
facilitate industrialization," but aggravated deindustrialization. UConn
paper: "Freight equalization policy' ensured uniform prices... but
marginalized." Quora: "Instead of the raw material rich states
setting up industries." The Hindu: "Concept of Freight Equalisation
was adopted in the 1950s during Jawaharlal Nehru's period." Wire:
"Introduced in 1952... to facilitate equal growth." Blind spots
stemmed from post-independence urgency, limited econometrics, and faith in
planning, as IMF notes on early plans. Persistence till 1993 shows entrenched
trade-offs, despite growing critiques.
Reflection
Reflecting on eastern India's saga, one can't help but
ponder the ironies of independence: a nation freed from colonial chains only to
forge new ones through misguided policies. The FEP, meant to unify, instead
fractured, turning resource riches into curses and widening disparities—eastern
per capita incomes stagnant at 60-70% of national averages by 1960, while
western states like Gujarat boomed above 120%. As Sanjeev Sanyal observed,
"The decline in eastern India traces to historical policies and lack of reform."
This narrative warns against hubris in planning—Nehru's socialist dream, while
noble, underestimated regional nuances, echoing Ambedkar's caution: "We
enter a life of contradictions." Data reveals the cost: per capita GDP in
West Bengal fell from 10.5% national share in 1960 to 5.6% in 2023, amid Naxal
violence claiming thousands. Yet, hope glimmers in post-1993 reforms; Odisha's
mining boom shows reversibility.
Lessons abound: equitable growth demands decentralized
incentives, not blanket subsidies. "Address root causes like inequality to
curb Naxalism," urges PWOnlyIAS. Corruption's grip, as in Bihar's
"descent" (index 0.88 vs. Gujarat's 0.67), calls for transparency.
Future policies must heed history—invest in eastern infrastructure, like the
Dedicated Freight Corridor, to revive clusters. As Shashi Tharoor quipped on
deindustrialization, "Britain's rise premised on India's fall"—let
not internal policies repeat this. Empowering the east could balance India's
growth, reducing migration and unrest. Ultimately, this betrayal underscores
democracy's fragility: when "greater good" sacrifices regions, it
sows division. Time for redemption through inclusive federalism, lest
disparities fester into deeper fractures.
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