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Global Wind Energy Trends

Global Wind Energy: Trends, Policies, and 2030 Outlook

Wind energy is a key driver of global decarbonization, with China, the EU, India, the USA, GCC, Singapore, Australia, and ASEAN advancing capacity and production. This note details their 2024 wind capacity and electricity production, compares these with 2014 figures, and calculates the 10-year CAGR. It explores regional policies, achievements, and five-year forecasts (2025–2030), highlighting unique challenges and opportunities. Drawing from sources like the IEA and GWEC, the analysis underscores China’s dominance, India’s steady growth, and emerging efforts in ASEAN and GCC. Policy support, grid integration, and investment will shape wind’s role in sustainable energy transitions.


Table: Wind Capacity and Electricity Production (2014–2024)

Country/Region

2024 Wind Capacity (GW)

2024 Wind Electricity Production (TWh)

2014 Wind Capacity (GW)

2014 Wind Electricity Production (TWh)

10-Year CAGR for Wind Electricity Production (%)

China

465.82

886 (est.)

114.6

153 (est.)

19.2%

EU

231

536

128.8

263 (est.)

7.4%

India

46.66

71.81

21.0

28 (est.)

9.9%

USA

148.4

430 (est.)

65.9

181.7

9.0%

GCC

2.5 (est.)

6 (est.)

0.1 (est.)

0.2 (est.)

40.1% (est.)

Singapore

0.05 (est.)

0.1 (est.)

0.0

0.0

N/A (est.)

Australia

12 (est.)

30 (est.)

3.8

9 (est.)

12.8%

ASEAN

10 (est.)

20 (est.)

0.5 (est.)

1 (est.)

34.9% (est.)



Analysis by Region

China

  • 2024 Data: 465.82 GW capacity, ~886 TWh production (est., based on GWEC data) [Ref 1]. China installed 80 GW in 2024, leading globally.
  • 2014 Data: 114.6 GW, ~153 TWh (est.) [Ref 2].
  • 10-Year CAGR: (886/153)1/10−1≈19.2%(886 / 153)^{1/10} - 1 \approx 19.2\%(886/153)1/10−1≈19.2%.
  • Policy: The 14th Five-Year Plan targets 1,200 GW of wind and solar by 2030, achieved early in 2024. Support includes auctions and grid priority for renewables [Ref 3].
  • Achievements: “China emerged as a dominant player, setting a new record with 75GW of new installations in 2023,” per GWEC, with 2024 continuing this trend [Ref 4]. Wind capacity doubled since 2020.
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Could reach 700 GW, producing ~1,200 TWh, with offshore wind expansion. “China’s success stems from comprehensive support for large-scale and distributed renewables,” notes the IEA [Ref 3]. Grid constraints and overcapacity are challenges.

European Union (EU)

  • 2024 Data: 231 GW capacity (210 GW onshore, 21 GW offshore), 536 TWh production [Ref 5].
  • 2014 Data: 128.8 GW, ~263 TWh (est.) [Ref 2].
  • 10-Year CAGR: (536/263)1/10−1≈7.4%(536 / 263)^{1/10} - 1 \approx 7.4\%(536/263)1/10−1≈7.4%.
  • Policy: The EU’s Green Deal targets 42.5% renewables by 2030, with wind key. Germany, France, and the UK use auctions and permitting reforms [Ref 5].
  • Achievements: Installed 12.9 GW in 2024, led by Germany (4 GW). “Germany’s 2030 targets for wind are broadly where they need to be for 1.5°C,” says Markus Hagemann of NewClimate Institute [Ref 6].
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Expected to reach 351 GW (140 GW new), producing ~800 TWh. “Europe would need to reach 425 GW by 2030,” per WindEurope, requiring faster permitting [Ref 5].

India

  • 2024 Data: 46.66 GW capacity, 71.81 TWh production (2022–23 data extended) [Ref 7].
  • 2014 Data: 21.0 GW, ~28 TWh (est.) [Ref 8].
  • 10-Year CAGR: (71.81/28)1/10−1≈9.9%(71.81 / 28)^{1/10} - 1 \approx 9.9\%(71.81/28)1/10−1≈9.9%.
  • Policy: Targets 140 GW wind by 2030, with offshore wind policies in Tamil Nadu and Gujarat. “India is the only G20 country on track to achieve Paris Agreement targets,” per SAS Partners [Ref 7].
  • Achievements: Added ~20.2 GW from 2021–2025 (GWEC estimate). Wind accounts for ~10% of installed capacity [Ref 7].
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Could reach 70 GW, producing ~100 TWh, with offshore wind growth. “Power generation from wind is likely to be cost-competitive by 2025–2030,” notes SAS Partners [Ref 7]. Land and grid issues persist.

United States (USA)

  • 2024 Data: 148.4 GW capacity, ~430 TWh production (est.) [Ref 9].
  • 2014 Data: 65.9 GW, 181.7 TWh [Ref 2].
  • 10-Year CAGR: (430/181.7)1/10−1≈9.0%(430 / 181.7)^{1/10} - 1 \approx 9.0\%(430/181.7)1/10−1≈9.0%.
  • Policy: Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) offers tax credits, but “Trump’s executive action to suspend offshore wind leasing could halt 5 GW,” warns Global Energy Monitor [Ref 9]. State-level renewable standards support growth.
  • Achievements: Wind and solar outproduced coal in 2024. “The US needs to grow wind capacity five-fold by 2030,” says Markus Hagemann [Ref 6].
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Could reach 200 GW, producing ~600 TWh, if IRA continues. Political uncertainty is a risk.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

  • 2024 Data: ~2.5 GW capacity, ~6 TWh production (est., based on UAE and Saudi projects) [Ref 10].
  • 2014 Data: 0.1 GW, ~0.2 TWh (est.) [Ref 2].
  • 10-Year CAGR: (6/0.2)1/10−1≈40.1%(6 / 0.2)^{1/10} - 1 \approx 40.1\%(6/0.2)1/10−1≈40.1% (est.).
  • Policy: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and UAE’s Energy Strategy 2050 target 50% clean energy. Public-private partnerships fund projects like Saudi’s Dumat Al Jandal.
  • Achievements: UAE and Saudi Arabia lead with ~1 GW each. “Cooperation with banks is needed to secure financing,” says a UN panelist [Ref 11].
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Could reach 10 GW, producing ~25 TWh, with offshore potential in UAE. “Encouraging private investments is key,” per the ASEAN-GCC-China Summit [Ref 10].

Singapore

  • 2024 Data: ~0.05 GW capacity, ~0.1 TWh production (est., minimal wind due to geography) [Ref 12].
  • 2014 Data: 0 GW, 0 TWh [Ref 2].
  • 10-Year CAGR: N/A (negligible base).
  • Policy: Green Plan 2030 focuses on solar, with wind limited by land and wind speeds. Imports from ASEAN are explored.
  • Achievements: Negligible wind capacity; focus on solar and imports. “Singapore decarbonizes its power sector,” says the World Economic Forum [Ref 12].
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Minimal growth (~0.1 GW), producing ~0.2 TWh, likely via imports. Land constraints limit onshore wind.

Australia

  • 2024 Data: ~12 GW capacity, ~30 TWh production (est.) [Ref 13].
  • 2014 Data: 3.8 GW, ~9 TWh (est.) [Ref 2].
  • 10-Year CAGR: (30/9)1/10−1≈12.8%(30 / 9)^{1/10} - 1 \approx 12.8\%(30/9)1/10−1≈12.8%.
  • Policy: Renewable Energy Target and state incentives support wind. Offshore wind zones are designated.
  • Achievements: Wind met ~10% of electricity demand. “Australia saw upticks in electricity demand growth,” per the IEA [Ref 13].
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Could reach 20 GW, producing ~50 TWh, with offshore projects. Grid stability is a challenge.

ASEAN

  • 2024 Data: ~10 GW capacity, ~20 TWh production (est., led by Vietnam) [Ref 14].
  • 2014 Data: 0.5 GW, ~1 TWh (est.) [Ref 2].
  • 10-Year CAGR: (20/1)1/10−1≈34.9%(20 / 1)^{1/10} - 1 \approx 34.9\%(20/1)1/10−1≈34.9% (est.).
  • Policy: ASEAN Plan of Action targets 23% renewables by 2025. Vietnam aims for 47% renewables by 2030, with 62% from wind and solar [Ref 14].
  • Achievements: Vietnam reached 4 GW wind by 2020. “ASEAN’s renewable shift promises new jobs,” says Dr. Dinita Setyawati of Ember [Ref 14].
  • Forecast (2025–2030): Could reach 30 GW, producing ~60 TWh. “Southeast Asia is far behind the 229GW needed,” warns the USSC [Ref 15].

Reflection

Wind energy’s growth reflects diverse regional dynamics. China’s 465.82 GW and 19.2% CAGR showcase policy-driven scale, while the EU’s 231 GW and 7.4% CAGR highlight steady progress amid permitting challenges. India’s 9.9% CAGR and 46.66 GW reflect cost-competitive growth, while the USA’s 148.4 GW faces political headwinds. GCC’s 2.5 GW and ASEAN’s 10 GW signal emerging potential, with Singapore’s negligible capacity limited by geography. Australia’s 12 GW benefits from high wind resources. Forecasts project China at 700 GW and the EU at 351 GW by 2030, but “the cost of inaction is simply too much,” warns Roongrote Rangsiyopash [Ref 10]. Grid integration, financing, and political stability are critical barriers. “Mutual trust and cooperation within ASEAN states would unveil pragmatic pathways,” notes the World Economic Forum [Ref 12]. Geopolitical risks, like US tariff policies, and fossil fuel reliance in GCC and ASEAN could slow progress. Wind’s affordability and scalability offer hope, but achieving 1.5°C targets requires accelerated policy alignment and investment.


References

  1. Global Energy Monitor, “Wind and solar year in review 2024,” 2025.

 

 

  1. IEA, Historical wind data estimates, 2014.
  2. IEA, “Renewables 2024,” 2024.
  3. GWEC, “Global Wind Report 2024,” 2024.
  4. WindEurope, “Wind energy in Europe: 2024,” 2025.
  5. Climate Analytics, “1.5°C wind and solar targets,” 2024.
  6. SAS Partners, “Wind Energy in India,” 2023.
  7. IEA, India wind capacity, 2014.
  8. Global Energy Monitor, US wind data, 2025.
  9. ASEAN-GCC-China Summit, Energy cooperation, 2024.
  10. UN High-Level Political Forum, Financing remarks, 2024.
  11. World Economic Forum, “Singapore’s Green Plan,” 2024.
  12. IEA, Australia energy trends, 2024.
  13. Ember, “ASEAN’s clean power pathways,” 2024.
  14. USSC, Southeast Asia renewable targets, 2024.

Notes:

  • Estimates for GCC, Singapore, and ASEAN use regional trends due to data gaps, with capacity factors of 25–35% for production.
  • CAGR formula: (End Value/Start Value)1/10−1( \text{End Value} / \text{Start Value} )^{1/10} - 1(End Value/Start Value)1/10−1.
  • Capacity in GW (AC); production estimates based on typical wind yields.

 

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