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The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Chessboard

The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Chessboard: A High-Stakes Energy Game

The Eastern Mediterranean has undergone a seismic shift in its geopolitical landscape over the past decade and a half, transitioning from a region primarily defined by historical grievances to a dynamic and fiercely contested energy frontier. The discovery of prodigious offshore natural gas reserves has set in motion a complex game of chess, drawing in a diverse array of actors, spurring billions in investment, and creating both opportunities for cooperation and flashpoints for conflict. This detailed examination delves into the motivations of the key players, the colossal financial stakes, the intractable disputes, and the broader global implications of this unfolding energy drama.



The Protagonists: Who's on the Board?

The cast of characters in the Eastern Mediterranean gas saga is extensive, each with their own strategic calculus:

  • Israel: The first major beneficiary of the gas boom, Israel’s discoveries of the Tamar field in 2009 (estimated 10 tcf) and the Leviathan field in 2010 (estimated 22 tcf) fundamentally transformed its energy outlook. From being energy-dependent, Israel is now a net exporter. As Brenda Shaffer, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, succinctly puts it, "In the Mediterranean, we do it backwards — we start by tallying up all the possible geopolitical benefits and don't think about the actual market." Beyond domestic consumption, Israel has significantly increased exports to neighboring Jordan and Egypt. In 2024, Israel produced 27.38 billion cubic meters (bcm) from its Leviathan, Karish, and Tamar fields, an 8.3% increase over 2023. Of this, 13.11 bcm were exported. The Leviathan partners recently submitted a $2.4 billion plan to expand the field's production capacity to 23 bcm/year.
  • Egypt: A historical gas producer, Egypt's discovery of the supergiant Zohr field in 2015 (estimated 30 tcf) by Eni was a game-changer for the entire region. Leveraging its existing multi-billion-dollar LNG liquefaction terminals at Idku and Damietta, Egypt quickly pivoted to become a crucial regional energy hub. Khaled Abu Bakr, Chairman of the Egyptian Gas Association, proudly declared, "Egypt has become a regional and strategic hub for gas and energy trading and exportation in the Eastern Mediterranean region." While Zohr's production peaked around 3.2 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) in 2019, it currently stands at about 1.5 bcfd, with Eni planning a $360 million investment to drill two new wells in 2025 to boost output. Egypt's total proven reserves stand at a robust 63.3 tcf.
  • Cyprus: Despite its smaller size, Cyprus holds significant proven and prospective reserves, notably the Aphrodite field (4.5 tcf) discovered in 2011, and more recent finds like Glaucus and Cronos. Its internationally recognized Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has become a focal point for both exploration and geopolitical contention. Chevron, in September 2024, submitted a revised $4 billion development plan for Aphrodite, aiming to connect it to Egyptian LNG facilities.
  • Greece: A staunch advocate for the EastMed pipeline, Greece views Eastern Mediterranean gas as a vital component of its energy security strategy and a way to enhance its geopolitical standing. It has actively forged strategic alliances with Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, creating a bloc that often finds itself at odds with Turkish claims.
  • Turkey: A major energy consumer (importing over 90% of its needs), Turkey harbors strong ambitions of becoming a regional energy hub itself. Its assertive maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, encapsulated by its "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan) doctrine, frequently overlap with Greek and Cypriot EEZs, leading to escalating tensions. Turkey has invested significantly in its own exploration capabilities, acquiring advanced drilling vessels like the Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, and Abdulhamid Han, and conducting extensive drilling operations. While much of Turkey's recent success has been in the Black Sea (e.g., the Sakarya field, estimated at 25 tcf), its Eastern Mediterranean activities remain contentious. As a SWP Berlin analysis points out, "Turkey's exclusion from regional initiatives, such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, exemplifies the challenges it faces in being recognised as a legitimate stakeholder at the table. This fuels Turkey's assertive approach, based on its perception of being deliberately sidelined."
  • Italy: Involved through its state-backed energy giant Eni, a key player in Egypt's Zohr and a partner in Cypriot exploration blocks. Italy is also a potential endpoint for any EastMed gas pipeline, given its energy needs.
  • Lebanon: Positioned with potentially significant offshore gas reserves, Lebanon's exploration efforts were long stymied by a maritime border dispute with Israel. The resolution of this dispute in 2022 opened the door for a consortium led by TotalEnergies and Eni to begin exploration drilling in Block 9, including the promising Qana prospect. Initial investments for this drilling are in the tens of millions of dollars.
  • USA: The diplomatic architect behind the breakthrough Israel-Lebanon maritime border deal, the US plays a crucial mediating role. Its interest lies in promoting regional stability, diversifying European energy supplies, and leveraging energy to counter Russian influence. Major US energy companies, particularly Chevron (operator of Leviathan) and ExxonMobil (active in Cypriot blocks), have invested billions in the region.
  • France: An increasingly active geopolitical and energy player, France, through TotalEnergies, has significant exploration interests in Cypriot waters. Its strategic alignment with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt reflects a broader French effort to project influence and balance power in the Eastern Mediterranean. As Politics Today noted in late 2021, "France is also encouraging cordial relations between Egypt and Greece in the hope of eventually creating a geopolitical crescent blocking Turkey's access to Libya and Algeria."
  • United Kingdom: While not directly involved in large-scale extraction, the UK maintains strategic interests due to its sovereign bases in Cyprus and the involvement of companies like Shell in some consortia.
  • Jordan and Palestine: These non-producer states are crucial as consumers, with Jordan already importing Israeli gas.
  • UAE and Saudi Arabia: These Gulf states have become increasingly involved in regional alliances, often aligning with the anti-Turkish bloc. Notably, Mubadala Petroleum, an Abu Dhabi government investment fund, acquired a 22% stake in Israel's Tamar field for $1 billion in 2021, demonstrating a tangible shift in regional energy diplomacy and investment.

The Financial Stakes: Billions Invested, Trillions at Play

The Eastern Mediterranean has already seen substantial investment, but the numbers pale in comparison to the region's full potential:

  • Past Investments (approximate):
    • Israel: Chevron and Delek Drilling have cumulatively invested billions of dollars in the Tamar and Leviathan fields. The Leviathan project alone saw an initial investment of around $3.75 billion for its first phase, with subsequent expansion plans costing hundreds of millions more.
    • Egypt: Eni's investment in Zohr is in the high single-digit billions of dollars, transforming Egypt's gas sector.
    • Cyprus: Exploration and appraisal activities by ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, and Eni have amounted to hundreds of millions to low billions of dollars. The proposed Aphrodite development plan submitted by Chevron in September 2024 is valued at $4 billion (€3.62 billion).
    • Turkey: Investment in its state-owned drilling fleet and associated operations in disputed waters has run into the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, part of Ankara's strategy to assert its presence.
  • Future Investments: Expect continued substantial investments:
    • Field Development: Billions will be poured into fully developing discovered fields, particularly in Cyprus (Aphrodite, Glaucus, Cronos) and potential new finds in Lebanon.
    • Infrastructure Expansion: Upgrades to existing pipelines from Israel to Egypt, and new subsea connections from Cypriot fields to Egyptian LNG terminals, could easily exceed $5-10 billion. The Leviathan partners alone are planning to invest $2.4 billion to boost its production capacity to 23 bcm/year.
    • Further Exploration: Geopolitical stability, or the perception of it, will drive further exploration wells, each costing tens to hundreds of millions.
    • Black Sea Focus: Turkey's multi-billion dollar investment in developing its Black Sea Sakarya field (estimated $30 billion over its lifespan) will also draw significant capital.
  • The Prize – Gas Reserves and Extracted Value:
    • Estimated Reserves: The US Geological Survey's 2010 estimates painted a tantalizing picture: a mean of 122 tcf in the Levant Basin and 223 tcf in the Nile Delta Basin. While these are estimates of undiscovered resources, proven reserves are already substantial. Israel holds around 6.22 tcf, Egypt 63.3 tcf, and Cyprus has discovered over 10 tcf across its various fields. Total discovered resources in the region are often compared to significant global gas provinces.
    • Potential Extracted Value: The economic stakes are colossal. A 2021 analysis suggested that discoveries from 2009-2019 alone had an economic value of approximately $460 billion (at 2019 gas prices). The estimated resource potential for the entire region could correspond to almost $1.8 trillion. In the near term (next 1-3 years), existing Israeli and Egyptian fields are generating billions of dollars annually in revenue, with Israel alone expecting its annual gas revenue to double from $1.3 billion to $2.6 billion in the coming years. In the medium term (3-7 years), as Cypriot gas comes online and export capacities expand, this figure could increase significantly. The long-term (beyond 7 years) value hinges on sustained global demand for gas and continued regional stability.

The Fault Lines: Where Aspirations Clash

Despite the immense potential for shared prosperity, the Eastern Mediterranean remains riddled with deep-seated disputes, primarily over maritime boundaries and resource ownership:

  1. Turkey vs. Greece and Cyprus (EEZ Delimitation): This is the most enduring and volatile conflict. Turkey, unlike most coastal states, disputes the right of islands (like Greek islands and Cyprus) to a full continental shelf or EEZ, arguing that their claims should be limited. This stance directly contradicts the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which Turkey has not ratified. This fundamental disagreement impacts vast swathes of the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. "No dispute has ever been resolved due to the allure of the oil and gas trade," a cynical but often accurate observation, reflects the deep-seated nature of these national claims.
    • Cyprus Division: Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus and asserts that the Turkish Cypriot community (Northern Cyprus) has an inherent right to a share of any offshore gas revenues. Ankara often sends its drilling vessels, escorted by naval assets, into areas claimed by Cyprus, leading to international condemnation and raising the specter of direct confrontation.
    • The Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal (2019): This controversial memorandum of understanding between Ankara and the then-Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli drew sharp condemnation from Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. The agreement demarcates a maritime boundary that controversially ignores the presence of major Greek islands like Crete and Rhodes, effectively creating a corridor for Turkey across the Eastern Mediterranean and attempting to block the proposed EastMed pipeline. As a LibyaReview article from June 2025 noted, the potential ratification of this deal by the Libyan parliament "could further escalate tensions over Mediterranean energy resources, while cementing Turkey's strategic foothold across Libya's political divide."
  2. Israel vs. Lebanon (Maritime Border): A historic point of contention, this dispute saw overlapping claims, notably Lebanon's "Line 29" versus Israel's "Line 23." The US-brokered agreement in October 2022 was a significant diplomatic achievement, largely settling the boundary using a modified Line 23. Crucially, it allows Lebanon to explore its Qana prospect, with a revenue-sharing mechanism for any gas that extends into Israeli-recognized waters. While celebrated, some analysts have pointed to ambiguities that could create future friction, as ScienceOpen highlighted in May 2025, suggesting "vague provisions and strategic language into the agreement, potentially allowing [Israel] to obstruct the development of the Qana field."
  3. Security Risks and Regional Conflicts: The volatile security situation, particularly the ongoing Israel-Hamas war and the broader Israel-Lebanon tensions, casts a long shadow over offshore energy projects. While direct attacks on platforms have not occurred, the inherent instability can deter long-term investment. As a Policy Center for the New South brief from February 2025 stated, "The ongoing conflicts in the region have created an environment of uncertainty that makes it difficult for companies to commit to long-term projects."

Broader Ripples: Impact on Global Gas Suppliers

The emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean as a gas source, particularly its emphasis on LNG exports, has implications for established global suppliers like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Azerbaijan:

  • Increased LNG Competition: The Eastern Mediterranean's entry into the LNG market via Egypt's liquefaction plants adds a new player. While volumes may not rival those of giants like Qatar (the world's largest LNG exporter, aiming for over 140 million tons per annum by 2030), they represent a new source of supply, especially for Europe. This could lead to increased competition for market share and potentially exert downward pressure on prices in a well-supplied market. "Any new reliable source of gas for Europe, particularly LNG, adds another layer of competition to the market," noted a European energy analyst. Qatar, with its massive expansion plans, is well-positioned to weather this, but it adds another variable to its market strategy.
  • Diversification for Europe: For Europe, desperately seeking to reduce its reliance on Russian gas since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Eastern Mediterranean offers a welcome new source of supply and diversification. While not a complete replacement for Russian volumes, it strengthens Europe's energy security and bargaining position. "Europe’s quest for energy independence has opened a window of opportunity for the Eastern Mediterranean," a senior EU energy official observed, "but the region’s inherent instability remains a challenge." Azerbaijan, a key gas supplier to Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor, will also watch closely as the Eastern Mediterranean's role grows. Greater diversification for Europe could slightly diminish the strategic leverage of any single pipeline supplier.
  • Shifting Investment Narratives: While the Gulf states remain central to global energy investment, the Eastern Mediterranean is attracting a growing share of upstream capital. This doesn't necessarily divert funds directly from the Middle East but broadens the landscape of attractive investment opportunities for international energy companies. The UAE's strategic investment in Israel's Tamar field signifies a conscious move to expand its energy portfolio beyond its traditional geography and to solidify new regional alliances.
  • Geopolitical Alignment: The energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean are increasingly intertwined with broader regional geopolitics. The emergence of the EMGF (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, Palestine, Greece, Italy, with France as observer) creates a new energy bloc, aligning states with shared interests and, in some cases, shared concerns about Turkey's regional ambitions. This forum represents a departure from traditional Arab-Israeli dynamics and fosters new security and economic cooperation, which could indirectly influence how countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia engage with these emerging alliances.

The Long Road Ahead

The Eastern Mediterranean gas chessboard is a complex tapestry woven from immense energy potential, deeply entrenched historical rivalries, and evolving global energy demands. The past 15 years have been marked by a flurry of discoveries, substantial initial investments, and the establishment of new geopolitical groupings. Yet, the region stands at a critical juncture, with its future largely dependent on overcoming persistent challenges.

The most pragmatic and likely export route for Eastern Mediterranean gas appears to be LNG via Egypt's existing liquefaction terminals. The ambitious EastMed pipeline project, once heralded as a symbol of regional cooperation, faces increasingly insurmountable hurdles. Its estimated multi-billion-dollar cost, technical complexities of deep-water construction, and, crucially, Turkey's steadfast opposition (as evidenced by the Turkey-Libya maritime deal designed to block it) make its full realization highly improbable. As Amos Hochstein, US Senior Advisor for Energy Security, famously quipped, "Why would we build a fossil fuel pipeline between the EastMed and Europe when our entire policy is to support new technology… and new investments in going green and in going clean?" This reflects both economic realism and the broader shift in energy priorities. Instead, the recent agreements between Cyprus, Eni, and TotalEnergies to funnel Cypriot gas through Egypt's Zohr facilities to Damietta underscore the growing consensus around LNG as the most viable path to market. "Egypt’s existing LNG facilities are the true game-changer, offering a flexible and market-ready solution for East Med gas," a regional energy analyst aptly summarized. This approach offers flexibility, caters to diverse global markets, and bypasses the most contentious maritime zones.

However, the shadow of unresolved maritime disputes, particularly between Turkey and Greece/Cyprus, remains the most significant impediment to unlocking the region's full potential. Turkey's "Blue Homeland" doctrine, backed by an assertive naval presence, constantly challenges established international maritime law and creates an environment of uncertainty that deters further large-scale investment. Until these fundamental disagreements over EEZ delimitations are addressed, either through bilateral negotiations, international arbitration, or a comprehensive regional energy architecture that includes all stakeholders, the Eastern Mediterranean will remain a geopolitical flashpoint. "Turkey's assertive energy diplomacy is a clear signal that it will not be sidelined in the Eastern Mediterranean," stressed a foreign policy expert. The path to stability and full economic realization requires an inclusive approach, acknowledging the legitimate interests of all coastal states.

Furthermore, the broader geopolitical instability, exacerbated by the ongoing conflicts in the Levant, poses a constant threat to investor confidence. Multi-billion-dollar energy projects require long-term stability and predictable regulatory environments. While current conflicts have not directly targeted offshore infrastructure, their proximity and potential for escalation introduce a risk premium that weighs heavily on investment decisions.

Finally, the global energy transition cannot be ignored. While natural gas offers a cleaner alternative to coal and oil as a "bridge fuel," the long-term trajectory is undeniably towards renewables. The Eastern Mediterranean producers must recognize that the "window of opportunity" for significant new gas developments is finite. They need to fast-track projects, ensure cost-competitiveness, and explore avenues for decarbonization, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) initiatives, to maintain relevance in a rapidly changing global energy landscape. "The window for large-scale, long-term gas investments is closing, and Eastern Mediterranean producers must act quickly to capitalize on current demand," argued an energy economist. The coming years will determine whether the Eastern Mediterranean fulfills its promise as a major gas supplier, contributing to both regional prosperity and global energy security, or if its vast reserves remain a source of perpetual geopolitical friction.

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